「operator」の検索結果

Idiomatic Go - package and interface design, error wrapping, table-driven tests, generics, the modern standard library (slices/maps/cmp/errors.Join), current syntax, and logging discipline. Use when writing, reviewing, or refactoring any Go code, especially code drifting toward Java/Spring shapes (deep layer trees, generic repositories, heavy frameworks) - even if the user never says "idiomatic". Distilled from spf13/go-skills and adapted to this repo.

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Hunt NoSQL Injection — MongoDB operator injection ($where, $regex, $gt, $ne), CouchDB, Redis command injection, auth bypass via NoSQLi, data dump. Use when target uses MongoDB/Mongoose, CouchDB, Redis, or shows NoSQL error messages.

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SQL injection testing skill for offensive security assessments and bug bounty hunting. Covers error-based, UNION-based, boolean/time-based blind, out-of-band, second-order, NoSQL, GraphQL, WebSocket, and JSON-operator SQLi. Includes WAF bypass techniques, database-specific exploitation (MySQL, MSSQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle), cloud-native attack paths, ORM CVE tracking, and SQLmap automation. Use when performing web application SQL injection testing, database enumeration, privilege escalation via SQLi, or assessing injection vectors in APIs and modern stacks.

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Hunting skill for sqli vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern NoSQL injection (Rocket.Chat CVE-2021-22911 MongoDB $regex, Mongoose ORM CVE-2024-53900 $where bypass), modern ORM raw-fragment SQLi (Django CVE-2024-42005, Sequelize GHSA-wrh9-cjv3-2hpw), second-order SOQL injection (HackerOne Salesforce), time-based blind SQLi in GraphQL resolvers, and SQLi on OIDC-proxy backends. Use when hunting SQLi on any target. Dedicated NoSQL operator injection (MongoDB/CouchDB $where/$regex/$ne) is owned by hunt-nosqli — NoSQL appears here only as adjacent ORM/WAF context.

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Comprehensive persistence tradecraft for authorized red team engagements covering Windows and Linux mechanisms. Windows techniques include registry Run/RunOnce keys, scheduled tasks, WMI event subscriptions, DLL search order hijacking, COM object hijacking, Startup folder drops, service creation, Security Support Provider (SSP) DLL injection, and Active Directory persistence (AdminSDHolder abuse, DCShadow, Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Skeleton Key, SID History injection). Linux techniques include cron and at jobs, systemd timers and services, SSH authorized_keys injection, shell profile backdoors (.bashrc/.bash_profile), PAM module backdoors, LD_PRELOAD hijacking, kernel module rootkits, web shells, and Git hook abuse. Provides operator-ready command sequences for SharPersist, Impacket ticketer, schtasks, sc.exe, crontab, and systemctl with OPSEC considerations for each method. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1547 (Boot or Logon Autostart), T1053 (Scheduled Task/Job), T1546 (Event Triggered Execution), T1556 (Modi...

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Comprehensive lateral movement tradecraft for authorized red team engagements covering credential-based movement (pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, overpass-the-hash), NTLM relay attacks (ntlmrelayx with PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, PrinterBug coercion), remote execution protocols (WMI, WinRM, DCOM, PsExec and alternatives), RDP session hijacking, and network pivoting through tunneling tools (chisel, ligolo-ng, SSH tunnels, SOCKS proxies). Provides operator-ready command sequences for mimikatz, crackmapexec/netexec, impacket suite, and evil-winrm with emphasis on OPSEC considerations, SMB signing bypass, and detection evasion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1021 (Remote Services), T1550 (Use Alternate Authentication Material), and sub-techniques. Includes defender-perspective detection guidance for blue team awareness and a rapid engagement cheatsheet for common lateral movement scenarios encountered during internal penetration tests and assumed-breach exercises.

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Comprehensive red team operations methodology covering full engagement lifecycle from planning through reporting. Addresses engagement scoping and rules of engagement negotiation, multi-tier C2 infrastructure design with redirectors and domain fronting, malleable traffic profiles and beacon tradecraft, OPSEC discipline including attribution avoidance and indicator management, EDR and AMSI evasion techniques using direct syscalls and unhooking, data collection with chain-of-custody controls, and structured reporting with purple team debrief workflows. Covers assumed-breach, external-to-internal, insider threat, and hybrid physical-cyber engagement scenarios with MITRE ATT&CK mapping throughout. Targets operators planning or executing adversary simulation engagements against mature defenders.

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Command and Control framework deployment, configuration, and operational tradecraft for red team engagements. Covers Cobalt Strike (malleable C2 profiles, Beacon types HTTP/HTTPS/DNS/SMB, Beacon Object Files for in-memory execution, sleep and jitter tuning, named pipe pivoting), Sliver (implant generation across mTLS/WireGuard/DNS transport, operator multiplayer mode, armory extensions), Mythic (agent ecosystem with Apollo/Poseidon/Medusa, C2 profile configuration, translation containers), Havoc (Demon agent with sleep obfuscation via Ekko/Zilean, indirect syscalls, dotnet inline execution), Metasploit (msfvenom payload generation, multi/handler staging, Meterpreter post-exploitation modules), redirector architecture using Apache mod_rewrite and Nginx, domain fronting through CDN providers, DNS-based C2 for restrictive network egress, and TLS certificate management for infrastructure OPSEC. Tools: Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Havoc, Metasploit Framework. Aligns to MITRE ATT&CK T1071 (Application Layer P...

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Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT. Built from authorized red-team work where conservative defaults caused multiple findings to be missed and one to be incorrectly retracted. Use at the START of any red-team engagement and again whenever feeling stuck or considering 'stopping' on a defended target. The single most important skill to load when scope is 'external red team' not 'bug bounty / WAPT'.

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Anti-forensics and evidence destruction techniques for red team operators conducting authorized engagements. Covers log clearing on Windows (wevtutil, Clear-EventLog, ETW provider patching) and Linux (journal truncation, utmp/wtmp binary editing, syslog manipulation), timestamp manipulation via Timestomp and SetMACE to defeat timeline analysis, filesystem-level anti-forensics including NTFS Alternate Data Streams for payload hiding and secure deletion with sdelete/shred, memory artifact removal to counter live forensics, disk artifact manipulation targeting MFT entries and USN journal records, network forensics evasion through encrypted C2 channels and DNS-over-HTTPS tunneling, and anti-VM/sandbox detection to avoid dynamic analysis environments. Tools: Timestomp, wevtutil, sdelete, shred, MimiPenguin, Invoke-Phant0m. Aligns to MITRE ATT&CK T1070 (Indicator Removal), T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information), T1497 (Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion). Each technique includes the forensic artifact it targets, t...

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Kubernetes cluster attack techniques covering the full attack lifecycle from initial foothold in a pod to cluster-wide compromise. Covers service account token theft and impersonation, RBAC misconfiguration exploitation including wildcard permissions and privilege escalation via role binding, direct etcd access for secret extraction, kubelet API abuse on port 10250 and read-only port 10255, pod escape via hostPID hostNetwork and hostPath volume mounts, Kubernetes secrets enumeration and decoding, admission controller bypass techniques, network policy bypass and lateral movement, cloud metadata service access from pods for credential theft on AWS EKS GCP GKE and Azure AKS, CRD and operator abuse for persistence, and node compromise via DaemonSet deployment. Tools include kubectl, kube-hunter, peirates, kubeaudit, kdigger, kubeletctl. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1609 Container Administration Command, T1610 Deploy Container, T1613 Container and Resource Discovery. Use this skill when assessing Kubernetes clusters,...

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Build AI agents that interact with computers like humans do - viewing screens, moving cursors, clicking buttons, and typing text. Covers Anthropic's Computer Use, OpenAI's Operator/CUA, and open-source alternatives. Critical focus on sandboxing, security, and handling the unique challenges of vision-based control. Use when: computer use, desktop automation agent, screen control AI, vision-based agent, GUI automation.

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Adversarial reviewer for The Federated Harbor whitepaper — the third paper in the Curiositech sequence after Anchor and Bonded Commons. Probes federation-specific threats: trust transitivity, cross-harbor token forgery, federated revocation under partition, cross-harbor Sybil, cross-domain settlement, equivocation, bond-pool draining, cold-start joining, federation-operator Sybil. Use during a versioned red-vs-white round; pairs with federated-harbor-whitehat. NOT for incident response, NOT for the Anchor or Bonded papers (use redteam-review).

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Own whether a multi-document product-architecture binder is internally consistent, complete against its stated customer/contingency/architecture coverage, and honest about which older product ambitions it has absorbed, superseded, deferred, contradicted, orphaned, or rejected. Use when running a binder Architect of Record pass, before an implementation chain cites a binder chapter as ready, when a proof-gate owner is missing, or when reconciling the binder against the older ambition corpus (website, plans, examples, ADRs). NOT for auditing a single Claude Skill bundle's structure or frontmatter (use skill-hygiene), rendering a single-PM accept/reject verdict on one finished deliverable (use port-daddy-user-surrogate-pm-review), or sequencing/stewarding a roadmap's sidequests once a gap or operator decision has been surfaced (use legible-roadmap-with-sidequests).

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Audits an Articles of Agreement contract — the daemon-witnessed agreement every official Port Daddy agent signs covering registration, transcript reporting, tool-use gating, file claims, parley conduct, budget limits, and operator control — against the enforcement-beats-hope bar: a clause counts as safe only when it resolves to a concrete, daemon-observable mechanism with a defined denial shape, never a promise the agent might honor. Use when drafting a new agent's Articles, reviewing a compliance-level (C0-C6) claim, deciding whether a clause is genuinely enforced or merely documented, or auditing whether an agent's claimed identity can be trusted. NOT for securing the inbound event-to-spawn path (fleet-event-spawn-trust), designing the relay's transport PKI and signing keys (pd-relay-zero-trust), or tracking an agent's identity and reputation across its whole lifetime after it signs (agent-identity-continuity-reputation).

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Track the full Toulmin epistemic ancestry of every claim produced by a multi-agent swarm. Each agent output is tagged with an argument chain (claim / data / warrant / relationship) derived from SwarmTracer spans and LineageEdge records, so operators can zoom into any sub-claim and see precisely which agents asserted it, what triggered each assertion, and how contradictions propagated or were synthesised away. The SwarmTracer pattern — wrapping the SwarmAgentExecutor to capture spans, record messages, and build a lineage graph — is the concrete runtime substrate. Argumentative lineage lifts that graph into the Toulmin vocabulary so reasoning provenance is both machine-queryable and human-interpretable.

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Verify every visual-evidence artifact (screenshot/GIF/recording) attached to a PR carries a provenance manifest binding it to real daemon-backed truth — daemon port, run id, transcript head hash, agent node id, commit, and an honest real/fixture/mock source label — and that operator-control-panel PRs cover the required set of proof states. Use when gating a PR's proof artifacts before merge, auditing whether a "LIVE" visual claim is backed by a real daemon run versus a reused or fixture-backed mock, or defining the required state-coverage set for a control-panel change. NOT for the capture technique itself — headless Playwright, `screencapture -x -l`, non-interruptive capture (use port-daddy-agent-skill's visual-evidence doctrine), designing the receipt body schema an artifact attaches to (use agent-work-receipt-designer), or the broader dogfood/Potemkin product-quality bar (use multi-agent-authoring-product-bar).

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Design or review a declared control-command profile and its verb/backend lifecycle matrix. Distinguish policy denial, unsupported capability, delivery acknowledgement, independently observed effect, and unknown outcome; bind authorization to principal, target, scope, current policy, expiry, and fencing epoch. NOT for claiming runtime correctness, proving an adapter from declarations, or approving a control-panel button without independent runtime evidence.

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Design low-friction UX, interaction patterns, and comeback loops for AI coding assistant apps, agent consoles, background coding agents, and Port Daddy swarm/operator surfaces. Use when creating flows like prompt-to-diff, context attach, plan/apply/review, checkpoint rollback, background-agent dashboards, visual proof, or multi-agent invocation. NOT for generic landing pages, static dashboards, or implementation-only changes without product flow.

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