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Builds WPF on .NET 8+. Host builder, MVVM Toolkit, Fluent theme, performance, modern C# patterns.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Specialized skill for ASP.NET Core integration testing. Use when testing Web API endpoints, HTTP request/response, middleware, and dependency injection. Covers WebApplicationFactory, TestServer, HttpClient testing, in-memory database configuration. Keywords: integration testing, web api testing, WebApplicationFactory, TestServer, HttpClient testing, controller testing, endpoint testing, RESTful API testing, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing, CreateClient, ConfigureWebHost, AwesomeAssertions.Web, Be200Ok, Be404NotFound, middleware testing, dependency injection testing

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Builds gRPC services. Proto definition, code-gen, ASP.NET Core host, streaming, auth.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Implements background work. BackgroundService, IHostedService, lifecycle, graceful shutdown.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Orchestrates .NET Aspire apps. AppHost, service discovery, components, dashboard, health checks.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Architects Blazor apps. Hosting models, render modes, routing, streaming, prerender.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect NTLM relay attacks through Windows Security Event correlation by analyzing Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB and LDAP signing enforcement across the domain, and detecting NTLM downgrade attacks from NTLMv2 to NTLMv1 using event log analysis.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Container escape is a critical attack technique where an adversary breaks out of container isolation to access the host system or other containers. Detection involves monitoring for escape indicators

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploying Cloudflare Access with Cloudflare Tunnel to provide zero trust access to self-hosted and private applications, configuring identity-aware access policies, device posture checks, and WARP client enrollment for VPN replacement.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Conducts comprehensive network penetration tests against authorized target environments by performing host discovery, port scanning, service enumeration, vulnerability identification, and controlled exploitation to assess the security posture of network infrastructure. The tester follows PTES methodology from reconnaissance through post-exploitation and reporting. Activates for requests involving network pentest, infrastructure security assessment, internal network testing, or external perimeter testing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised system following order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, processes, and system state before they are lost.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Systematically collects, categorizes, and distributes indicators of compromise (IOCs) during and after security incidents to enable detection, blocking, and threat intelligence sharing. Covers network, host, email, and behavioral indicators using STIX/TAXII formats and threat intelligence platforms. Activates for requests involving IOC collection, indicator extraction, threat indicator sharing, compromise indicators, STIX export, or IOC enrichment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction, and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis, Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based intrusion detection on Linux.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Triage AEM Workflow issues on AEM as a Cloud Service by classifying symptoms, gathering the right logs and metrics, and mapping to runbooks or Splunk searches. Use when the user asks for workflow activity/errors on a Cloud Service host, needs to classify a Jira ticket, or wants to know what to collect for workflow debugging.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Create, modify, review, and harden configuration for the Adobe Dispatcher Apache HTTP Server module and Apache HTTPD in AEM as a Cloud Service environments only. Use for `.any`, vhost, rewrite, cache, and filter changes.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Evil Twin / KARMA / Mana access point methodology — rogue AP construction with hostapd-mana / wifiphisher / airgeddon, KARMA universal probe response, Mana selective probe response, captive portal phishing, deauth-driven client coercion to attacker AP, MAC randomization defeat via PNL leak analysis, post-association MITM (DNS, ARP, transparent proxy), credential capture for portal/web/SMB, and detection-evasion tactics. Use to coerce client devices onto an attacker-controlled AP, intercept their traffic, harvest credentials, or deliver payloads via captive portal.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

You are helping a penetration tester exploit Apache JServ Protocol (AJP)

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Wireless / 802.11 attack methodology for red team engagements and wireless security assessments. Covers monitor-mode setup, WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture and PMKID attacks, WPA3 SAE downgrade and Dragonblood, WPA-Enterprise (EAP) attacks (MSCHAPv2 cracking, EAP-TLS cert theft, evil-twin RADIUS), Karma / Known Beacons / Mana evil twin attacks, captive-portal phishing, KRACK and FragAttacks, WPS Pixie Dust, deauthentication and disassociation attacks, rogue AP construction (hostapd-mana), 802.1X bypass, MAC randomization defeat, BLE/Zigbee/IEEE 802.15.4 sidebands, and Wi-Fi 6/6E/7 considerations. Use when scoping wireless pentest, war-driving an estate, or testing corporate wireless segmentation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (including ones only findable via the Wayback Machine), and behaviorally diff old vs. current versions for auth/rate-limit/validation regressions rather than just response-shape differences. Distinct from hunt-api-misconfig, which owns exploitation once you have a spec or endpoint (mass assignment, JWT, OData, Swagger-chain attacks); distinct from hunt-subdomain, which owns host-level discovery. This skill owns the version-inventory and behavioral-diff workflow itself. Use when the target has versioned API paths, multiple specs, a changelog referencing deprecated endpoints, or a mobile app whose hardcoded backend calls look older than the current web app's.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Discover a single-page-app's hidden backend API from its public JS bundle, then test that API for broken access control / missing authentication. One of the highest-yield web plays in modern recon — SPAs ship their entire backend route map to the browser, and the API behind them is frequently missing the auth middleware the login page implies. Built from an authorized engagement where this play found an unauthenticated financial API that an ASM scan reporting hundreds of 'Criticals' completely missed. Use whenever a target serves a JS-heavy SPA (React/Vue/Angular/Next), an 'app'/'console'/'dashboard'/'portal' subdomain, or any `*api*` host shows up in recon. Leaked build artifacts (source maps / .env / .git / asset-manifest) are owned by hunt-source-leak; API version-inventory and behavioral diffing by hunt-shadow-api; this skill owns mapping a live SPA's backend routes from its JS bundle and testing them for broken access control / missing auth.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps, OAuth/SSO session linkage, device-bound-session (DBSC) downgrade, and cookie attribute issues (Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/__Host-). Validate with TWO real sessions (attacker A + victim B), body-diff every 200, and OOB confirmation for theft chains. Medium to Critical (fixation→admin hijack, no-invalidation→persistent ATO).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Comprehensive methodology for auditing and exploiting TLS/SSL implementations and misconfigurations across network services and mobile applications. Covers protocol downgrade attacks including POODLE (CVE-2014-3566) against SSLv3 CBC padding, DROWN (CVE-2016-0800) cross-protocol attack leveraging SSLv2 export ciphers to decrypt TLS sessions, and FREAK (CVE-2015-0204) forcing RSA export-grade key exchange. Addresses BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) exploiting CBC IV predictability in TLS 1.0, CRIME (CVE-2012-4929) and BREACH targeting TLS-level and HTTP-level compression oracles respectively, and Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) for OpenSSL memory disclosure. Covers certificate validation bypass techniques for applications with improper hostname verification or chain validation, certificate pinning bypass using Frida and Objection for mobile application interception, HSTS bypass via NTP manipulation and subdomain exploitation, TLS 1.3 0-RTT replay attacks against non-idempotent endpoints, mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication a...

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。