Threat-models protocols where authority, scarce resources, bonds, bounties, escrow, reputation, ordering, adjudication, or settlement create strategic incentives. Use to test attack utility, conservation, collusion, Sybil resistance, oracle capture, griefing, custody, liquidity, and residual risk. NOT for choosing payment or bond amounts without evidence, smart-contract code audit, legal or employment classification, DeFi trading, admitting workers, or settling claims.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月8日 更新
Game-theory primitives for divergent incentives: Nash equilibrium, auctions, mechanism design, collusion, bargaining, reputation. Use when modeling strategic play.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
vasilyu1983/AI-Agents-public☆ 912026年10月5日 更新
Design or audit an agent identity, credential, session, continuity, and reputation plan. Use when attributed outcomes must survive key rotation, restart, recovery, or review; when choosing Elo, TrueSkill, a contextual bandit, or an LLM judge; and when making Sybil, newcomer, calibration, collusion, and evidence limits explicit. Produces a supplied-plan consistency audit, never proof of observed delivery, cryptographic identity, or live enforcement. NOT for proving personhood, global Sybil resistance, or an unobserved delivery.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月8日 更新