「directory」の検索結果

Guide for organizing MSBuild infrastructure with Directory.Build.props, Directory.Build.targets, Directory.Packages.props, and Directory.Build.rsp. Only activate in MSBuild/.NET build context. USE FOR: structuring multi-project repos, centralizing build settings, implementing NuGet Central Package Management (CPM) with ManagePackageVersionsCentrally, consolidating duplicated properties across .csproj files, setting up multi-level Directory.Build hierarchy with GetPathOfFileAbove, understanding evaluation order (Directory.Build.props → SDK .props → .csproj → SDK .targets → Directory.Build.targets). Critical pitfall: $(TargetFramework) conditions in .props silently fail for single-targeting projects — must use .targets. DO NOT USE FOR: non-MSBuild build systems, migrating legacy projects to SDK-style (use msbuild-modernization), single-project solutions with no shared settings. INVOKES: no tools — pure knowledge skill.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants to submit their product to startup, SaaS, AI, agent, MCP, no-code, or review directories for backlinks, domain rating, and discovery. Also use when the user mentions "directory submissions," "submit to directories," "backlinks from directories," "list my product," "submit to Product Hunt," "BetaList," "TAAFT," "Futurepedia," "G2 listing," "Capterra listing," "AlternativeTo," "SaaSHub," "AI directories," "MCP registry," "publish my MCP server," "awesome list," "llms.txt directory," "Claude plugin directory," "agent directory," "dofollow backlinks," "launch directories," or "directory tracker." Use this whenever someone is planning the directory layer of a product launch or an ongoing backlink campaign. For the broader launch moment, see launch. For programmatic SEO pages that should live behind these backlinks, see programmatic-seo. For AI citation optimization, see ai-seo.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants to submit a product or app to directories, curated lists, launch platforms, or app stores—and needs ready-to-paste copy per platform. Reads root contextus.md when present. Also use when the user mentions "directory submission," "get listed," "app store listing," "submit to directories," "curated list," "best tools list," "Taaft," "Product Hunt," "directory ads," "newsletter feature," "directory campaign," "tailor description per platform," "Shopify App Store," "Chrome Web Store," "navigation site," or "product directory." For Product Hunt launch day tactics (hunter, first comment, timing), use product-hunt-launch. For full 0→1 channel planning, use cold-start-strategy.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants to submit their product to startup, SaaS, AI, agent, MCP, no-code, or review directories for backlinks, domain rating, and discovery. Also use when the user mentions "directory submissions," "submit to directories," "backlinks from directories," "list my product," "submit to Product Hunt," "BetaList," "TAAFT," "Futurepedia," "G2 listing," "Capterra listing," "AlternativeTo," "SaaSHub," "AI directories," "MCP registry," "agent directory," "dofollow backlinks," "launch directories," or "directory tracker." Use this whenever someone is planning the directory layer of a product launch or an ongoing backlink campaign. For the broader launch moment, see launch. For programmatic SEO pages that should live behind these backlinks, see programmatic-seo. For AI citation optimization, see ai-seo.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunts for Active Directory credential and replication attacks — DCSync, Golden/Silver Ticket, and DCShadow — by analyzing directory-service-access (4662), Kerberos TGS (4769), and logon (4624) events for replication abuse and forged-ticket anomalies. Activates for requests to hunt DCSync, detect golden/silver tickets, or find Active Directory replication abuse.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants to submit their product to startup, SaaS, AI, agent, MCP, no-code, or review directories for backlinks, domain rating, and discovery. Also use when the user mentions "directory submissions," "submit to directories," "backlinks from directories," "list my product," "submit to Product Hunt," "BetaList," "TAAFT," "Futurepedia," "G2 listing," "Capterra listing," "AlternativeTo," "SaaSHub," "AI directories," "MCP registry," "agent directory," "dofollow backlinks," "launch directories," or "directory tracker." Use this whenever someone is planning the directory layer of a product launch or an ongoing backlink campaign. For the broader launch moment, see launch. For programmatic SEO pages that should live behind these backlinks, see programmatic-seo. For AI citation optimization, see ai-seo.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hardens LDAP directory services against credential harvesting, LDAP injection, anonymous binding, and channel-binding bypass by enforcing LDAPS, channel binding, and LDAP signing. Use when securing an LDAP or Active Directory environment against these attack classes or auditing directory service configurations for these vulnerabilities.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

USE ONLY for (1) two or more projects with repeated MSBuild policy, targets, or package versions, or (2) an existing Directory.Build.props/targets/rsp hierarchy with an import, placement, or layering defect. A one-project repo without an existing Directory.Build file is outside scope; do not load this skill. Covers centralizing shared policy and targets, Directory.Packages.props across projects, parent hierarchy/import structure, props-versus-targets placement, and folder/project exceptions. An existing hierarchy defect remains in scope when only one project is affected. For property value or condition semantics use property-patterns. Exclude legacy-to-SDK migration and non-MSBuild systems.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants to run paid ads within directories or marketplaces. Also use when the user mentions "Taaft ads," "Shopify App Store ads," "G2 sponsored," "Capterra ads," "directory ads," "marketplace ads," "paid listing," "sponsored listing," or "directory promotion." For organic listings, use directory-submission.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

USE ONLY for (1) two or more projects with repeated MSBuild policy, targets, or package versions, or (2) an existing Directory.Build.props/targets/rsp hierarchy with an import, placement, or layering defect. A one-project repo without an existing Directory.Build file is outside scope; do not load this skill. Covers centralizing shared policy and targets, Directory.Packages.props across projects, parent hierarchy/import structure, props-versus-targets placement, and folder/project exceptions. An existing hierarchy defect remains in scope when only one project is affected. For property value or condition semantics use property-patterns. Exclude legacy-to-SDK migration and non-MSBuild systems.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Execute a DCSync attack mimicking the behavior of a legitimate Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). Leverage Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (DRSR) permissions to silently request and extract the password hashes (NTLM/Kerberos) of any or all users in the domain without executing code on the target Domain Controller.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Specialized skill for testing file system operations using System.IO.Abstractions. Use when you need to test File, Directory, Path operations, or simulate file system. Covers IFileSystem, MockFileSystem, file read/write testing, directory operation testing, etc. Keywords: file testing, filesystem, file testing, file system testing, IFileSystem, MockFileSystem, System.IO.Abstractions, File.ReadAllText, File.WriteAllText, Directory.CreateDirectory, Path.Combine, mock file system, file abstraction

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Design discovery, directories, and guilds for agent swarms at scale. Use when agents need to find each other on a shared surface: capability indices, yellow-pages directories, whois/phonebook routing, reputation-aware discovery, and guild structures that scope trust. Covers the canonical prior art (FIPA Directory Facilitator, Contract Net, Chord/DHT, DNS-SD/Consul, EigenTrust, Greif's merchant guilds) and the failure modes (read-poverty, Sybil reset, Goodhart on rank, directory staleness, cold-start). Triggers: "agents can't find each other", "who owns this file/skill", "route a question to the right agent", "capability registry", "agent reputation", "guild / federation of fleets". NOT for issuing identities, granting authority, or automatically assigning work from a directory entry.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Implement Microsoft's Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) tiered administration model for Active Directory, covering Tier 0/1/2 separation, privileged access workstations (PAWs), administrative forest design, and authentication policy silos. Use when designing or hardening AD privileged-access architecture, segmenting Domain/Enterprise Admin accounts into tiers, or containing lateral movement and credential theft (pass-the-hash, Kerberoasting, golden tickets).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。