「game-theory」の検索結果

Game-theory primitives for divergent incentives: Nash equilibrium, auctions, mechanism design, collusion, bargaining, reputation. Use when modeling strategic play.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

This skill covers game-theoretic methods in structural econometrics and industrial organization. Use when the user is working with strategic interactions, equilibrium analysis, or game-theoretic structural models — including entry games, conduct testing, auction models with strategic bidding, bargaining, or matching markets. Triggers on "Nash equilibrium", "subgame perfect", "best response", "strategic interaction", "entry game", "conduct testing", "auction", "mechanism design", "matching market", "bargaining", "BNE", "Bayesian Nash", "static game", "dynamic game", "repeated game", "multiple equilibria", "equilibrium selection", "discrete game", "oligopoly", "game-theoretic", "player", "payoff", "strategy", "dominant strategy", "Bresnahan-Reiss", "Ciliberto-Tamer", "partial identification", "set identification", or markup test.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Generate, continue, revise, polish, and stress-test game theory research papers. Use when the user provides a game theory topic, phenomenon, draft, outline, model idea, literature anchor, reviewer comments, or asks for 博弈论论文生成, 选题建模, 文献迁移, 模型修正, 均衡分析, 数值模拟, 论文润色, 改稿打磨, or R&R response work.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when drafting an AAMAS rebuttal to preliminary OpenReview reviews, covering the double-blind constraint, the no-new-results and no-revised-paper norms, how to answer game-theory, MARL, and systems reviewers at once, and how to give the area chair a clean acceptance rationale within a short response window.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when preparing AAMAS supplementary material - proofs, extended game and mechanism definitions, extra multiagent experiments, opponent-set details, and the anonymized artifact zip - under the size cap, anonymity, and reviewer-discretion limits, including how to split a game-theory-plus-experiments paper across the 8-page body and the supplement.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when planning an AAMAS project timeline from venue fit through abstract, full-paper or extended-abstract upload, supplementary material, the double-blind rebuttal, decision, IFAAMAS camera-ready, registration, and presentation, with track-specific deadlines and backward-planning offsets for a game-theory-plus-experiments paper.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when packaging AAMAS multiagent code, environments, opponent and population sets, random seeds, game definitions, and logs as anonymous supplementary evidence or a public post-acceptance release, even without a separate artifact badge, so that game-theory and MARL reviewers can inspect and re-run the interaction claims.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when positioning an AAMAS submission against multiagent, game-theory, and reinforcement-learning literature spread across AAMAS, AAAI, IJCAI, NeurIPS, ICML, EC, and JAAMAS, including arXiv and workshop versions, concurrent submissions, prior conference versions, and the cross-community citation coverage AAMAS reviewers expect.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when explaining or planning around AAMAS peer review, covering OpenReview review release, the double-blind rebuttal on preliminary reviews, area-chair discussion, the mixed game-theory, MARL, and systems reviewer pool, the public posting of reviews and decisions, and how acceptance criteria weigh the interaction contribution.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

"Apply basic game theory concepts including Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, and the Prisoner's Dilemma to analyze strategic interactions. Use this skill when the user needs to model competitive decisions, predict rival behavior, design incentive mechanisms, or evaluate cooperation vs competition scenarios — even if they say 'what will our competitor do', 'should we cooperate or compete', or 'how do we set up the right incentives'.".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Game theory expert covering Nash equilibrium, strategic thinking, auction theory, and cooperative games

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Threat-models protocols where authority, scarce resources, bonds, bounties, escrow, reputation, ordering, adjudication, or settlement create strategic incentives. Use to test attack utility, conservation, collusion, Sybil resistance, oracle capture, griefing, custody, liquidity, and residual risk. NOT for choosing payment or bond amounts without evidence, smart-contract code audit, legal or employment classification, DeFi trading, admitting workers, or settling claims.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Treat tokens as a coding swarm's cost-of-goods-sold and legibility engine while accounting for finite subscription allowance when per-call price is unknown. Covers provider windows, remaining-usage evidence, burn forecasts, preemptive checkpoint/model switching, per-agent budgets, compaction, shared digests, context degradation, and spend metering. Activate on: "token budget", "context budget", "compaction strategy", "briefing as compression", "context rot", "summarization collapse", "COGS for agents", "subscription usage remaining", "five-hour or weekly limit", "burn forecast", "model switch before limit", or "/context-economics-for-agent-swarms". NOT for: memory architecture (use always-on-agent-architecture), single-prompt wording (use prompt-engineer), mechanism-design proofs (use nisan-et-al-2007-algorithmic-game-theory), physical containment (use sandboxed-adversarial-test-harness), or production rebodiment and fencing (use agent-resurrection-and-body-continuity).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。