「supply-chain」の検索結果

Identify poisoned training data and backdoored ML models across the pipeline using IBM's Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (activation clustering, spectral signatures, trigger reconstruction), Cleanlab for label-quality issues, and supply-chain checks like weight-hash verification and safetensors enforcement. Use before training or deploying on third-party/user-contributed data or downloaded checkpoints, during ML supply-chain reviews, or when investigating model misbehavior tied to specific inputs (suspected backdoor trigger).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Audits a project's dependencies for supply-chain risk: version-matched advisories for direct dependencies and the full lockfile tree, abandoned or archived upstreams, npm publisher concentration, and install-time script execution. Use when asked to audit dependencies, assess supply-chain or third-party package risk, or review a dependency tree before an engagement.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect known malicious npm package versions and install-time supply-chain indicators in repositories, lockfiles, and node_modules. Use when a user mentions an npm compromise, Shai-Hulud, the Keyv/cacheable incident, suspicious preinstall scripts, credential-stealing packages, or asks whether a JavaScript project was exposed to a package supply-chain attack. Do not use as a general CVE or license audit.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

"Net-zero transition playbook: GHG inventory (ISO 14064-1, GHG Protocol Scope 1/2/3), science-based targets (SBTi), TCFD and ISSB S1/S2 climate disclosure, Taiwan carbon fee, decarbonization roadmap, internal carbon pricing, supply-chain carbon, product carbon footprint, green electricity and T-REC. Use for corporate decarbonization roadmap, carbon inventory, carbon-fee response, TCFD/ISSB reporting, supply-chain decarbonization, or responding to international customers (Apple, RE100). Triggers: 『碳盤查』『SBTi』『碳費』『TCFD』『淨零路徑』『範疇 3』『綠電』『CBAM』『ISO 14064』『ISSB』『T-REC』. For Taiwan EMBA ESG/sustainability/operations/strategy/finance cases. Focuses on Taiwan listed-company and supply-chain practice; sustainability strategy theory: use Asgard `grad-sustainability`; ERM 框架整合氣候風險: use `biz-erm`; 董事會 ESG 委員會結構設計: use `biz-corporate-governance`; 併購 ESG 盡職調查: use `fin-m-and-a`.".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use for software supply-chain security assessment covering SBOM, SCA, CI/CD pipelines, container images, build integrity, dependency provenance, and vulnerability reachability.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for supply chain attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions, dependency confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated audit. Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Triage npm packages and lockfiles for install-script malware, credential exfiltration, and worming behavior using GuardDog, manual tarball inspection, and dynamic detonation with network/filesystem monitoring. Use when vetting a new dependency, reviewing a package.json/package-lock.json during code review, checking lockfiles against a supply-chain advisory's known-bad versions, or investigating a host suspected of installing a trojanized package.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect and prevent dependency confusion (public-over-private package name resolution) in npm, PyPI, and Maven by enumerating claimable internal package names with tools like `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan`, then enforcing source restrictions via `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`/`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `settings.xml`. Use when onboarding a repo to a supply-chain security program, auditing lockfiles/manifests for confusable dependencies, or after an incident that may have leaked internal package names.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Parses Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) in CycloneDX and SPDX JSON formats to identify supply chain vulnerabilities by correlating components against the NVD CVE database via the NVD 2.0 API. Builds dependency graphs, calculates risk scores, identifies transitive vulnerability paths, and generates compliance reports. Activates for requests involving SBOM analysis, software composition analysis, supply chain security assessment, dependency vulnerability scanning, CycloneDX/SPDX parsing, or CVE correlation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect agentic supply-chain risks: compromised dependencies, malicious plugins/tools/models, and untrusted update sources.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Rigorous, defensible email-spoofability verdict and SPF supply-chain risk analysis computed from published DNS alone. Deepens the record-level SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC fetch recipes in the offensive-osint arsenal (§16.14) with the reasoning that section doesn't do: a priority-ordered composite verdict for whether an attacker can actually land header-From-spoofed mail in an inbox, and by which vector (exact-domain vs subdomain) — grounded in the single most-misunderstood distinction in email security: the envelope MAIL FROM that SPF authenticates vs the visible header From: that only DMARC governs. Explains precisely why SPF -all/~all alone is NOT spoof-proof without DMARC enforcement, and why SPF +all bypasses DMARC even under p=reject pct=100. Covers RFC 7208 §4.6.4's 10-DNS-lookup / 2-void-lookup PermError fail-open condition with a runnable stdlib-only lookup-counter script, plus the SPF-include-takeover supply-chain vector (an attacker re-registering a dead include inherits SPF-pass authority over the victim domain) with strict transient-vs-NXDOMAIN discrimination discipline so a temporary SERVFAIL is never mistaken for a takeover lead. Fully passive: DNS TXT reads only, no mail sent, no RCPT TO probe, no API keys. Use when auditing a domain's real spoofing resistance (not just its published records), explaining to a client why 'we have SPF -all' does not mean they're covered, investigating an SPF PermError or an unusually long include chain, evaluating a dead SPF include as a takeover lead, or writing a defensible spoofability finding for a deliverable.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Organization-grade cloud and supply-chain attack-surface discovery: S3/GCS/Azure Blob bucket discovery via observed-name mining (CNAME/cert-SAN/Wayback) and bounded two-class permutation (6 prefixes x 15 suffixes on trusted tokens, bounded target-bound expansion on subdomain stems), existence (HEAD/GET) vs public-listing confirmation, object-key triage into 9 value tiers (database dumps, credentials, IaC state, kubeconfig, VCS dirs, config, archives, PII, logs), dangling-CNAME bucket-takeover detection, and the ownership-gated severity model that stops an unattributable public bucket from becoming a false CRITICAL; the fully offline AWS-account-ID recovery from a leaked AKIA/ASIA/AROA access key (base32 decode, runnable stdlib Python, canonical test vector, AWS-documentation-example-ID screening); dependency-confusion confirmation for npm/PyPI (internal-signal classifier -- private-registry binding vs org-namespace match -- paired with a read-only public-registry 404 check and the npm scope-claimability nuance the public search API misses); and passive cloud-native/container/Kubernetes/CI control-plane fingerprinting (Lambda URLs, API Gateway, Cloud Run, App Service, kubelet/etcd/K8s API/dashboard, Jenkins/GitLab/Argo CD) as an org-attribution and exposure surface. Passive/discovery only -- no exploitation, no credential submission, no active control-plane confirmation (a stage-6 validate_cloud active tier is described but out of scope). Use when enumerating a target's cloud storage footprint, recovering an AWS account ID from a leaked key, confirming a supply-chain dependency-confusion vector, or fingerprinting cloud-native/K8s/CI infrastructure for an authorized external recon engagement.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Supply-chain testing via package-manager dependency confusion: when internal package names resolve to attacker-controlled public registries, leading to malicious install and script execution. Use for npm/pip/gem/Maven/Composer/Docker manifest review and authorized red-team supply-chain exercises.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Audits legal AI skills, prompts, workflows, MCP/tool instructions, and agent packages for prompt injection, malicious instructions, unsafe scripts, suspicious metadata, credential exposure, exfiltration paths, persistence mechanisms, and supply-chain risk. Use before installing, importing, publishing, promoting, modifying, or trusting third-party or generated AI skills and legal workflows. Do not use as a generic code review unless skill trust, workflow safety, prompt injection, or supply-chain hygiene is in scope.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use for software supply-chain security assessment covering SBOM, SCA, CI/CD pipelines, container images, build integrity, dependency provenance, and vulnerability reachability.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Install-time cooldowns for npm/bun plus a sandboxed pre-install scan for bypasses. Use for supply-chain attacks or npm security.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Audits dependency supply chains for bad versions, lockfile drift, and artifact integrity. Use when adding deps, handling incidents, or releasing a plugin.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Apply @aleabitoreddit ("Serenity")'s distilled stock-analysis method to ANY ticker, sector, or situation — critical-chokepoint / supply-chain-OSINT idea discovery, first-principles value-chain decomposition, a Buffett-style quality gate (moat / profitability / customer-replacement risk, all default unverified), and narrative-vs-fundamentals hygiene. Produces a beginner-friendly Chinese analysis (她的观点 / 小白解释 / 第一性原理 / Buffett 直接判断 / 当前结论) that classifies an idea as 研究地图 vs 可投资结论. Trigger on "analyze like Serenity / 用 aleabito 的方法分析 / 用 Serenity 框架 / critical chokepoint 分析 / 第一性原理 + Buffett 判断这只股 / supply-chain bottleneck thesis". Never emits buy/sell calls.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when the user asks about supply-chain attacks, third-party / vendor compromise (SolarWinds, Kaseya, 3CX, MOVEit, XZ-utils-style), software-bill-of-materials risks, or library / dependency-injection attacks. Self-updating knowledge cell.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Forensic scan for npm/PyPI supply-chain compromise (Shai-Hulud/TeamPCP campaigns) — checks persistence, hook injection, compromised packages, IOC strings, C2, dead-man switches. Use when auditing a machine or repo for malicious dependencies. Trigger on "supply chain audit", "check for compromised packages", "Shai-Hulud", "scan for malicious deps".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the AI Supply Chain by injecting malicious models, datasets, or dependencies. Use this skill to simulate advanced persistent threats (APTs) compromising Hugging Face repositories, manipulating pre-trained weights (Model Poisoning), and exploiting insecure deserialization during model loading (e.g., Pickle files).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Supply-chain testing via package-manager dependency confusion: when internal package names resolve to attacker-controlled public registries, leading to malicious install and script execution. Use for npm/pip/gem/Maven/Composer/Docker manifest review and authorized red-team supply-chain exercises.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。