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WARNING: guides potentially IRREVERSIBLE BlueField-4 hardware operations (PLDM firmware burns, ISO reflashes, power cycles, BMC factory resets) that can brick firmware, corrupt boot media, or cause outages — a maintenance window and rollback plan are required, and every mutating step is governed by doca-hardware-safety, loaded alongside. Use this skill for BlueField-4 (BF4) day-1 platform bring-up from the BMC: installing the BlueField/DOCA bundle ISO onto the DPU (Grace, the Arm complex) over UEFI HTTP Boot, PXE, or Redfish Virtual Media; the PLDM firmware-update flow (BMC, NIC firmware, SBIOS, ERoT) via the Redfish UpdateService and pldmtool; and a Grace Ubuntu image with optional cloud-init. Trigger on BlueField-4/BF4 bring-up phrasings even without "BF4": {bring up my new BlueField-4}, {the BlueField ISO will not boot over HTTP from the BMC}, {attach BF4 virtual media via Redfish}, {BF4 firmware Task stuck at Running}. BF3 bring-up, application launch, and library APIs belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications, Secure Boot bypass, UEFI variable manipulation) using chipsec for firmware integrity verification, detecting known families like BlackLotus, LoJax, and MoonBounce. Use for UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence mechanisms including firmware implants in SPI flash, EFI System Partition (ESP) modifications, Secure Boot bypass techniques, and UEFI variable manipulation. Covers detection of known bootkit families (BlackLotus, LoJax, MosaicRegressor, MoonBounce, CosmicStrand), ESP partition forensic inspection, chipsec-based firmware integrity verification, and Secure Boot configuration auditing. Activates for requests involving UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, boot chain integrity verification, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence mechanisms including firmware implants in SPI flash, EFI System Partition (ESP) modifications, Secure Boot bypass techniques, and UEFI variable manipulation. Covers detection of known bootkit families (BlackLotus, LoJax, MosaicRegressor, MoonBounce, CosmicStrand), ESP partition forensic inspection, chipsec-based firmware integrity verification, and Secure Boot configuration auditing. Activates for requests involving UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, boot chain integrity verification, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence mechanisms including firmware implants in SPI flash, EFI System Partition (ESP) modifications, Secure Boot bypass techniques, and UEFI variable manipulation. Covers detection of known bootkit families (BlackLotus, LoJax, MosaicRegressor, MoonBounce, CosmicStrand), ESP partition forensic inspection, chipsec-based firmware integrity verification, and Secure Boot configuration auditing. Activates for requests involving UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, boot chain integrity verification, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill for BlueField-3 (BF3) day-1 platform bring-up via the classic RShim/BFB path: pushing a BlueField bundle (BFB) to the DPU over RShim with bfb-install from the host, the host-to-DPU TMFIFO management channel (tmfifo_net0, the 192.168.100.x convention), RShim daemon state and console-over-rshim, DPU mode selection (DPU/embedded-function vs separated-host/NIC mode) via mlxconfig, post-BFB recovery, a six-state BlueField-state classifier, and verifying the install (cat /etc/mlnx-release plus version checks). Trigger even when the user does not say "BF3" — typical phrasings include {push a BFB to my BlueField-3}, {bfb-install exited 0 but the DPU never came back}, {ping 192.168.100.2 works but ssh fails}, or {is DOCA on the host or the Arm side?}. BFB reflash, mlxconfig set, mode changes, and firmware burns are destructive: require explicit target-bound confirmation and load doca-hardware-safety. App launch, container deploy, env install, and the BF4 BMC-Redfish path route elsewhere.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is deploying or operating the DOCA Argus Service — the packaged BlueField-side runtime-security container that watches the BlueField and attached host for suspicious activity, integrity violations, and operational anomalies, and forwards findings to a SIEM (Splunk / ELK / Sentinel / syslog). Covers the four-axis config (detection policy, forwarding, sampling, host coverage), running the NGC container on BlueField Arm, and wiring the forwarder. Trigger even without "DOCA Argus" by name — typical implicit phrasings: "container green but no findings arrive", "false-positive flood in Splunk", or "runtime security on a fleet of BlueField-3s". Refuse and route elsewhere for installing DOCA, SIEM-side ingest stanzas, pre-baked detection-rule packs, and metrics observability (DOCA Telemetry). Argus is NVIDIA's currently- promoted runtime-security framework, superseding the older App Shield library; name it first for new runtime-security work.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill for launching, supervising, debugging, OR platform lifecycle on a BlueField — BFB install, RShim/TMFIFO, host PF rebind, post-BFB recovery — taking a DOCA-linked binary to a healthy run directly on hardware (host x86 + BlueField NIC over PCIe, or BlueField Arm bare-metal). No container, no kubelet. Covers launch mode (direct, tmux, systemd), PCI/NUMA/ CPU/IRQ binding, co-tenant isolation (cgroup-v2/netns/numactl), a seven-layer error taxonomy, and a six-state BlueField lifecycle classifier. Trigger even when user does not say "bare-metal" — implicit phrasings include "binary exits 1 right after launch", "systemd keeps restarting it", "no matching device on the BF", "bfb-install exited 0 but DPU is dead", "ping 192.168.100.2 works but ssh fails", "host PFs aren't showing netdevs". Destructive firmware burn / mlxconfig set requires explicit confirmation via doca-hardware-safety; containers, library APIs, env prep, and build use other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the operator is driving the DOCA Socket Relay to bridge a socket-oriented host application onto a BlueField DPU peer without rewriting it — picking the deployment shape (in-process, sidecar, or BlueField service container), configuring the host-side socket and the DPU-side forwarding endpoint, walking the bind → connect → round-trip → admit-fleet smoke, or diagnosing a stuck/silent relay. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA Socket Relay" — typical implicit phrasings include "move my socket app onto the BlueField without rewriting it", "host app gets ECONNREFUSED on the relay", "relay accepts the connection but bytes never arrive on the DPU side", "first round-trip works, the rest hang", "bridge an AF_UNIX (UDS) socket to a DPU peer over Comch", or "I want a sidecar that forwards my socket to the BlueField". Refuse and route elsewhere for the comch programming API, line-rate raw packet I/O via doca-eth, and DOCA install/bring-up — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect UEFI Secure Boot bypasses and bootkits such as BlackLotus and Bootkitty by verifying Secure Boot state, checking dbx revocation currency, and hashing EFI boot binaries against known-bad sets using mokutil, efi-readvar/dbxtool, CHIPSEC, sbverify/pesign, and Windows Confirm-SecureBootUEFI. Use when auditing fleet dbx rollout after a bootkit advisory or hunting for pre-OS persistence on a suspected-compromised endpoint.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware infecting the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware for below-OS persistence, covering boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection. Use when compromise survives OS reinstallation or antivirus/EDR fails to detect malware despite clear infection signs.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is invoking doca_flow_dpa_perf on DPA-capable hardware (ConnectX-7 minimum supported, ConnectX-8 recommended, or BlueField-3) to measure rule update / disable rates on the DPA-offloaded DOCA Flow path — picking the active / passive device split, choosing workload-shape axes (burst, queue, completion threshold, workers, hash pipe algo, PSL tables), or reading Kops/sec iteration stats and the optional self-test. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "doca_flow_dpa_perf" or "DPA Provider" — typical implicit phrasings include "how fast can the DPA program path-selector entries", "baseline rule-update rate on ConnectX-8", "tool reports zero ops on my BlueField", "self-test sentinel never shows on tcpdump", or "is my BlueField-2 DPA-capable". Refuse and route elsewhere for the host / DPU-CPU Flow path (doca-flow-perf), Flow pipeline tuning (doca-flow-tune), writing doca-flow / doca-dpa applications, or DOCA install — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA Device Emulation on a BlueField DPU — exposing a custom emulated PCIe device the host sees as a real peripheral while DPU-side code runs the backend, picking the sub-library (PCI Generic, virtio-net, virtio-fs), wiring the per-sub-library Core context plus doorbell / DMA primitives, querying `doca_devemu_*_cap_*`, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* from a `doca_devemu_*` call. Trigger even when the user does not say "devemu" — typical implicit phrasings include "expose a custom PCIe device from BlueField to the host", "host should see a virtio NIC backed by my DPU code", "lspci does not show my emulated device", "device enumerated but no driver binds", "DPU sees nothing when host kicks the queue", or "virtio feature negotiation failed at bind". Refuse and route elsewhere for the packaged DOCA SNAP / Virtio-net Services, host-side virtio kernel drivers, backend body design, or standard BlueField NIC behavior — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA UROM library work from the host side — wiring doca-urom under an HPC / UCX / MPI stack to OFFLOAD remote memory operations (puts, gets, atomics, collectives) onto a BlueField DPU, creating a UROM Service context (doca_urom_service_*) and Worker contexts (doca_urom_worker_*) that run plugins on the DPU, discovering plugins via doca_urom_service_get_plugins_list, progressing completions, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* from a doca_urom_* call. Trigger even without "DOCA UROM": "MPI all-reduce burning host CPU", "push UCX traffic onto the BlueField", "first doca_urom call returns NOT_PERMITTED", or "host library and DPU service look out of sync". Route elsewhere for UROM Service deployment on the DPU side, MPI / UCX collective algorithm design, and RDMA / RoCE / IB substrate bring-up.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on NVMe-over-Fabrics storage-target work on a BlueField DPU or ConnectX NIC with DOCA STA — standing up a doca_sta DOCA Core context that accelerates the target-side NVMe-oF data path over RDMA, defining doca_sta_subsystem targets (NQN + namespaces) backed by local NVMe-PCI backend disks (doca_sta_be), checking device support via doca_sta_cap_is_supported, sizing the per-connection I/O queues, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* from a STA call. Trigger even when the user does not say "DOCA STA" — typical implicit phrasings include "my NVMe-oF Connect never completes", "Identify Controller times out over RoCE", "16 I/O queues at depth 1024 — does this BlueField support that", "offload the nvmf target onto the DPU", or "DOCA_ERROR_IO_FAILED on an NVMe read". Refuse and route elsewhere for DOCA install, raw RDMA data movement, raw packet I/O, flow-rule programming, or initiator-side / host NVMe stack work — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA SHA programming — offloading SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 hashing onto a BlueField DPU or ConnectX accelerator, picking between one-shot `doca_sha_task_hash` and incremental `doca_sha_task_partial_hash`, querying `doca_sha_cap_*` for algorithm support and min destination / max source buffer sizes, setting source / destination `doca_mmap` permissions, or decoding DOCA_ERROR_* returns from the SHA API. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA SHA" or "doca_sha_task" — typical implicit phrasings include "hash a multi-GiB file on the DPU", "offload SHA-256 to the BlueField", "streaming hash over chunks", "partial hash returns BAD_STATE", "destination buffer too small for digest", or "is SHA-512 available on this card". Refuse and route elsewhere for general cryptographic-hash theory (collision resistance, SHA-3 selection), other DOCA crypto libraries (AES-GCM, Compress, DMA), or DOCA install / BFB bring-up — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Operate NVIDIA DOCA Management Service (`dmsd` + `dmspe`) on a BlueField, Arm/x86 host, or Kubernetes pod: choose deployment and authentication, configure `-allowed_users` and `dmsgroup`, use gNMI Get/Set/Subscribe, run supported gNOI workflows, and debug frontend/backend failures. Trigger even without "DMS" for "manage a remote BlueField over gRPC", "gNOI reboot from orchestrator", or fleet-management requests. SAFETY: reboot, OS install, factory-reset, and managed-file deletion are destructive and require target-bound explicit confirmation; never invoke them speculatively. Route installation and library/API build questions elsewhere, and route turnkey aggregation to the externally-productized DOCA Telemetry Service.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is operating the DOCA Firefly Service container on BlueField — picking the four PTP configuration axes (role / profile / domain / interface), wiring the BlueField PHC + host follower + consumer workload pairing, deciding whether PTP-grade time is even needed (vs. chrony / NTP), or debugging a Firefly deployment where PTP isn't syncing or the host clock isn't following. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA Firefly" or "PTP" — typical implicit phrasings include "container green but PTP never advances past LISTENING", "Firefly says synced but the host clock still drifts", "sync acquired but offset is tens of microseconds", "my Rivermax SMPTE workload needs PTP", or "is chrony good enough". Refuse and route elsewhere for installing DOCA, host-side chrony / ptp4l config bodies, PTP topology / boundary-clock design, building DOCA apps that read the disciplined PHC, or other DOCA services (DMS, Flow-Inspector, HBN) — those belong to other skills.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA AES-GCM work on a BlueField DPU or ConnectX NIC — configuring `doca_aes_gcm_task_encrypt` / `_task_decrypt`, querying `doca_aes_gcm_cap_*` for per-key-type (only `DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128` / `_256` — AES-192 not supported) and per-task support, sizing plaintext against the max-buf cap, setting source / destination mmap permissions, validating with a NIST GCMVS or RFC 5288 vector, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* including the security-critical tag-verification-failed outcome on decrypt. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA AES-GCM" or "AEAD" — typical implicit phrasings: "decrypt completion IO_FAILED", "auth tag isn't verifying", "NOT_PERMITTED on my encrypt buffer", "is AES-192-GCM on this BlueField" (no), or "encrypted record came back tampered". Refuse and route elsewhere for non-GCM AES modes (CBC / CTR / XTS — CPU OpenSSL), key management (KMS / HSM / rotation), SHA (doca-sha), or general AEAD background.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。