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llm-redteam

LLM application red-teaming — prompt injection (direct + indirect), jailbreak, system-prompt leak, data exfiltration, guardrail bypass, multi-turn crescendo, cross-lingual + cipher + invisible-unicode token smuggling, excessive agency / tool abuse, insecure output handling. Canonical OWASP LLM Top 10 + ASI01-ASI10 mapping. Use when a target exposes a chat/completions/assistant/copilot endpoint, an AI feature that consumes user text or documents, or any /v1/chat, /api/chat, /mcp surface.

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LLM Red-Team

Reflection is not exploitation. A model that echoes your payload is noise; a model that acts on it — leaks its system prompt, emits your canary, calls a tool, renders raw HTML downstream — is a bug. Prove the action, then chain it to concrete impact.

This is the first-class LLM-attack skill. The scanner behind it is tools/llm_redteam.py (canary-based corpus runner, /llm-redteam). For auditing an MCP server, use skills/mcp-server-audit; for attacking a deployed agent black-box, use skills/agentic-app-audit.

0. QUICK KILL CHECKLIST

Kill the lead (classify Informational, move on) when:

  • The model refuses and no canary / leak / tool-call ever lands. "It said something edgy" is not a finding.
  • System-prompt "leak" is just generic assistant boilerplate ("I am a helpful assistant"), not the target's actual instructions.
  • Prompt injection fires but reads/changes nothing the current user couldn't already access (no cross-tenant data, no tool with impact).
  • Output looks like XSS but the host app escapes it before rendering (check the actual downstream sink, not the chat response).
  • Exfil payload is a markdown image beacon but the client never fetches remote images.

1. ROUTING TABLE — signal on target -> what to run

SignalRun
Any chat/assistant endpointtools/llm_redteam.py --url <endpoint> --field <json-field> (full corpus)
OpenAI-style API--template '{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"{{PAYLOAD}}"}]}' --response-path choices.0.message.content
Only want one class--category jailbreak (see --list-categories)
Uploads/RAG/"summarize this doc"indirect-injection + token-smuggling (invisible unicode in the doc)
Agent has toolsexcessive-agency category + skills/agentic-app-audit
Confirm blind exfilplant a canary host, correlate with tools/oob_listener.py

2. ATTACK CLASSES (corpus categories)

The runner fires a canary per run (RT_PWNED_xxxx); a category "lands" when the canary / a real leak / a tool-call shows up in the response.

  • prompt-injection — direct instruction override, delimiter breaks.
  • jailbreak — DAN / developer-mode persona escape.
  • system-prompt-leak — repeat-above, keyword-anchor, scenario-escape.
  • data-exfil — markdown-image beacon / canary emission to an attacker host.
  • indirect-injection — payload framed as a retrieved document / tool result (the high-value one for RAG apps).
  • guardrail-bypass — base64 / split-string instruction smuggling.
  • multi-turn-crescendo — single-shot simulation of a gradual escalation jailbreak.
  • cross-lingual — override instruction in another language to dodge English-only filters.
  • cipher-obfuscation — leetspeak / ROT13-wrapped instruction.
  • token-smuggling — invisible "Sneaky Bits" unicode (U+2062/U+2064) carrying a hidden instruction (shared encoder with tools/hai_payload_builder.py).
  • excessive-agency — coerce an unsafe tool call / exfil (SSRF via "fetch URL", email send, payment).
  • insecure-output — get the model to emit raw HTML/script that a downstream sink renders (XSS via AI).

3. CANONICAL OWASP ASI01-ASI10 (single source of truth)

This table is the ONE authoritative ASI mapping for the whole toolkit — skills/bug-bounty and skills/web2-vuln-classes both defer to it. If you edit the taxonomy, edit it here.

IDClassWhat to testChain to
ASI01Prompt Injection / Goal HijackOverride objectives via direct or indirect injectionIDOR / exfil / tool abuse
ASI02Tool MisuseAttacker-controlled tool params ("fetch this URL", code tool)SSRF / RCE
ASI03Privilege CompromiseAgent uses broader perms / admin tokens than the userPriv-esc / cross-tenant
ASI04Supply ChainCompromised plugin / MCP server / tool-output poisoning next agentRCE / data theft
ASI05Code ExecutionUnsafe code-interpreter / sandbox escapeRCE
ASI06Memory & Context PoisoningPersistent RAG/memory corruption across sessions/usersStored injection affecting all users
ASI07Agent CommunicationInter-agent spoofing / IDOR (agent A reads agent B's context)Cross-tenant disclosure
ASI08Excessive AgencyDestructive action without confirmation; cascading failuresFunds/email/delete
ASI09Insecure Output HandlingAI output rendered as XSS / SQLi / command injection downstreamXSS / injection
ASI10Sensitive Information DisclosureLeaks system prompt / keys / configs / user dataSecrets -> deeper access

Triage rule: ASI alone = Informational. It is a bounty only when chained to IDOR / exfil / RCE / ATO with a working PoC.

4. CHAIN TO IMPACT (what makes it payable)

StandaloneChainResult
Prompt injection+ reads another user's conversation/data (IDOR)High
Indirect injection (RAG doc)+ persists in memory -> hits every userHigh/Critical
Tool misuse "fetch URL"+ hits internal service / IMDS and returns dataSSRF (Medium/High)
Insecure output+ the host renders it -> stored XSS -> session theftHigh
System-prompt leak+ the prompt contains an API key / internal URLHigh
Excessive agency+ unconfirmed destructive action (send funds, delete)High/Critical

5. CONFIRMATION DISCIPLINE (no false positives)

  • A category only counts when the canary / real leak / tool-call is observed in the response — never on "it sounded compliant."
  • For blind exfil, require a correlated out-of-band callback (tools/oob_listener.py), not just a rendered beacon tag.
  • For insecure-output XSS, confirm execution at the downstream sink with the XSS verifier (tools/verifiers/xss.py / tools/dom_xss_harness.py), not in the chat reply.
  • Record the exact payload + response excerpt; the report must be reproducible verbatim.

レビュー

まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。

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概要と使いどころ

Black-box security audit of a DEPLOYED AI agent (not the MCP server behind it) — tool-call hijacking, cross-session memory poisoning, confused-deputy via connected tools, agent-to-agent IDOR, excessive agency / unconfirmed destructive actions, and privilege compromise where the agent holds broader perms than the user. Use when the target is a live assistant/agent product with tool access (bookings, email, payments, file/RAG, browsing) rather than a raw LLM chat box or an MCP server you can read.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5,3282026年10月10日 更新

argus

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Argus — the all-seeing scanner suite. Six automated scanners for high-value web + LLM bug classes — CORS misconfiguration (origin reflection / null / credentialed read), CRLF & host-header injection, NoSQL injection (operator auth-bypass / $where blind), JWT attacks (alg:none / RS256→HS256 confusion / secret crack), out-of-band confirmation of blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE/Log4Shell via interactsh, and an LLM red-team corpus (prompt-injection / jailbreak / system-prompt leak / exfil / indirect injection). Use when a target exposes a JSON API, a login endpoint, JWT auth, a parameter that might reach the server, a chatbot/agent, or any endpoint suspected of a blind/out-of-band bug.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5,3282026年10月10日 更新

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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5,3282026年10月10日 更新

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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5,3282026年10月10日 更新

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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5,3282026年10月10日 更新

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