Adversarial Code Review

Review code from an attacker's perspective using STRIDE + OWASP frameworks.

4-Phase Review Process

Phase 1: Trust Boundary Analysis

Identify where trust transitions occur:

• External input reaching internal logic without validation → Tampering
• Implicit trust between services → Elevation of Privilege
• Shared storage without isolation → Information Disclosure
• Authentication boundaries not clearly marked → Spoofing

Output: [TRUST-BOUNDARY] findings with location, threat type, and current validation level.

Phase 2: Attack Surface Mapping

Map all entry points and exposure:

• Public API endpoints and auth requirements
• File upload/download paths → Path traversal risk
• External system calls (URLs, queries) → SSRF/Injection
• Event handlers and callbacks → Race conditions
• Error message verbosity → Information Disclosure

Output: [ATTACK-SURFACE] table with endpoint, exposure level, and mitigation status.

Phase 3: Business Logic Review

Analyze logic flaws that static analysis misses:

• State machine violations (skip steps, replay)
• Authorization != authentication (authn ok but authz missing)
• Race conditions in multi-step operations
• Numeric overflow/underflow in financial calculations
• Default-allow vs default-deny patterns

Output: [LOGIC-FLAW] findings with exploitation scenario and impact.

Phase 4: Defense Evaluation

Assess existing defense mechanisms:

• Input validation completeness (allowlist vs blocklist)
• Output encoding consistency
• Rate limiting and abuse prevention
• Logging coverage for security events
• Secret management (hardcoded credentials, env leaks)

Output: [DEFENSE-GAP] findings with recommendation.

Output Format

For each finding:

[CATEGORY] Severity: HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW
Location: file:line
Finding: Description
Attack: How an attacker would exploit this
Fix: Recommended remediation

Depth Modes

• quick: Phase 1 + 2 only (trust boundaries + attack surface)
• thorough: All 4 phases with detailed exploitation scenarios

Integration

• Complements dev-review (best practices) with attacker perspective
• Works with sec-codeql-expert for pattern-based + logic-based coverage
• Can be chained: dev-review → adversarial-review for complete coverage
• Works with action-validator for action-space legality checking

Action-Space Legality (AutoHarness Pattern)

• Do agents only call tools within their declared tools frontmatter?
• Do file operations stay within R002-declared access scope?
• Are domain boundaries respected (backend agent not editing frontend files)?
• Could an agent's task contract be tightened without losing functionality?

CRG Integration (Optional Token-Efficiency)

공격 표면 분석에 crg-integration 스킬을 우선 호출하여 트러스트 boundary를 빠르게 매핑한다:

Phase	CRG Tool	Purpose
Attack surface	get_impact_radius	보안 변경의 영향 추적 (recall-우선)
Caller analysis	query_graph	신뢰 boundary 함수의 모든 caller 추적
Diff focus	get_minimal_context	보안 변경의 최소 review unit
Regression detect	detect_changes	보안 의미 변경 감지

Fallback (CRG 미설치 시)

CRG MCP 미연결 시 sec-codeql-expert + grep 조합으로 fallback. CRG의 recall-우선 특성 보완 위해 sec-codeql-expert (precision-우선)와 병행 권장.

R013 Ecomode 정합

대규모 변경 PR (>50 lines) 또는 context >= 60% 시 CRG 호출 권장.

Refs: #1171 (CRG 통합), #1180 (본 cross-ref 추가)

Permission Mode

When spawning agents via the Agent tool during this skill's execution, always pass mode: "bypassPermissions". The Agent tool default (acceptEdits) overrides agent frontmatter permissionMode, causing permission prompts during unattended execution.