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terraform

Use when writing Terraform — AWS modules, resources, variables, outputs, remote state — even when the user just says 'provision this infra' or 'add an S3 bucket' without naming Terraform.

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terraform

When to use

Use this skill when writing or modifying Terraform configurations (.tf files), creating new infrastructure modules, or understanding AWS resource definitions.

Procedure: Write Terraform config

  1. Read the infrastructure repo structure (check agents/overrides/skills/terraform.md for the repo location).
  2. Check existing modules in modules/ for patterns and conventions.
  3. Read variables.tf of the target module to understand required inputs.
  4. Check versions.tf for provider version constraints.

Project structure (typical)

{infrastructure-repo}/
├── environments/
│   ├── pro/                    # Production environment
│   │   ├── root.hcl            # Terragrunt root config
│   │   ├── core/               # Core infrastructure (VPC, DNS zones)
│   │   └── {service}/          # Per-service resources
│   └── sta/                    # Stage environment
│       └── ...
├── modules/
│   ├── core/                   # VPC, DNS, shared resources
│   └── {service}/              # Per-service module (ECS, ALB, ECR, etc.)
└── Taskfile.yml                # Task runner commands (or Makefile)

Read agents/overrides/skills/terraform.md for the actual repository layout and service names.

Conventions

Provider versions

  • Always pin provider versions in versions.tf.
  • Check versions.tf in the existing modules for the project's version constraints.

Module sources

Prefer community or organization-specific Terraform modules from the Terraform Registry:

module "alb" {
  source  = "{org}/application-load-balancer/aws"
  version = ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0"
}

Check existing modules in the project for which registry modules are used.

Naming

  • Resource prefix: var.global_prefix (e.g., {project}-{env})
  • All resources must include tags = var.tags
  • Security groups: ${var.global_prefix}-<purpose> (e.g., -ecs, -mysql, -redis)
  • Log groups: /aws/ecs/${cluster}/${service}

State management

  • Remote state in S3 with DynamoDB locking.
  • State is encrypted.
  • Key pattern: ${path_relative_to_include()}/terraform.tfstate

Variables

  • Use typed variable blocks with description.
  • Use object() types for complex inputs (not any unless unavoidable).
  • Use optional() with defaults where appropriate.
  • Group variables by domain (naming, network, ECS, Redis, database, etc.).

Lifecycle rules

  • Use ignore_changes = [task_definition] on ECS services — task definitions are managed by CI/CD, not Terraform.
  • Use deletion_protection = true on databases.

Security

  • OIDC authentication for GitHub Actions (no long-lived credentials).
  • Secrets stored in AWS Secrets Manager.
  • Security groups follow least-privilege: only allow traffic between known services.
  • IAM policies use specific resource ARNs, not wildcards (except where unavoidable).

Permissive defaults and missing security blocks

The failure that reaches production is almost never a pinned-version mistake; it is a resource that works either way and was left on its permissive default. Four constructs carry it. Each backstop grep is over the .tf tree you are changing, not over this repository.

Backstop grepWhat a hit meansOverride condition
grep -rn '0\.0\.0\.0/0' --include='*.tf' .An ingress or egress rule whose CIDR is 0.0.0.0/0, i.e. open to the whole internet. On a management or database port stop and treat it as CRITICAL - the corpus row enumerates which ports those are.A deliberately public listener - an ALB or CloudFront origin on 80/443. Nothing else. Record the reason next to the rule.
grep -rn 'publicly_accessible|block_public_acls|ignore_public_acls' --include='*.tf' .Either publicly_accessible = true on a database, or a bucket with no public-access block present at all. Absence is the more common hit and the grep returning nothing is the failing case.A bucket that genuinely serves public web assets, with the policy written explicitly rather than inherited from a default.
grep -rnE '"(Action|Resource)" *: *"\*"|= *\["\*"\]' --include='*.tf' .A wildcard IAM action or resource. One compromised workload credential then reaches everything in the account.A named, reviewed exception - iam:PassRole scoped by condition, or a bootstrap role. Never the default.
grep -rL 'encrypt' --include='*.tf' . (lists files with NO encryption mention; -L prints names only, so no -n)A storage, volume, snapshot, or database resource with no encryption block.None for data at rest. A resource holding no data at all.

Read the surface class before the fix, not after: the mitigation text, the abuse case, and the negative test live in the infrastructure rows of threat-modeling's corpus, which is the single authority for them. Ask that skill's grounded-corpus step for the infrastructure surface class - it carries the invocation - and describe the change you are making, e.g. terraform security group ingress open to 0.0.0.0/0. Do not copy the command here: one skill owns that interface, for the same reason one file owns the control text.

Those rows also carry a Decided by: clause stating which check actually decides each one. For all four constructs above that clause reads NO CHECK IN THIS REPOSITORY - no HCL or IAM-policy parser ships here, so these greps and your own IaC policy scanner are the whole enforcement story. Do not write or imply otherwise.

Common patterns

ECS service with CodeDeploy (Blue/Green)

Used for web services with zero-downtime deployments:

  • ALB → Target Group → ECS Service
  • CodeDeploy handles traffic shifting
  • Auto-rollback on CloudWatch alarms (5xx error rate)

ECS service without CodeDeploy

Used for workers and schedulers:

  • Direct ECS service update
  • deployment_controller { type = "ECS" }
  • lifecycle { ignore_changes = [task_definition] }

GitHub OIDC IAM role

Each environment has a GitHub IAM role with:

  • OIDC trust policy (scoped to repo + environment)
  • Policies for ECR push/pull, ECS deployment, Secrets Manager read, CloudWatch logs

Output format

  1. Terraform configuration files (.tf) with proper module structure
  2. Variables, outputs, and state management config

Auto-trigger keywords

  • Terraform
  • AWS infrastructure
  • modules
  • resources
  • state management

Known pitfalls

SymptomRoot causeFix
Error acquiring the state lock blocks every commandA prior apply crashed / was killed and left the lock held (DynamoDB / backend lock)Confirm no apply is actually running, then terraform force-unlock <lock-id> — never delete the lock table
plan wants to destroy+recreate a resource after a renameRenaming a resource block changes its address; Terraform sees the old address gone and a new one addedterraform state mv <old.addr> <new.addr> (or a moved {} block) so it tracks the same object
count/for_each errors with "value depends on resource attributes that cannot be determined until apply"The count/for_each expression reads an unknown (not-yet-created) valueKey for_each off a static/known map, or split into a two-stage apply with -target
A change applies but the next plan shows the same diff again (perpetual diff)The provider normalizes/computes the attribute differently than written (ordering, defaults, case)Match the provider's canonical form, or ignore_changes on that attribute in lifecycle
plan shows a resource as tainted/replaced after a manual console changeOut-of-band drift — someone edited the resource outside Terraformterraform apply -refresh-only to reconcile state, then decide code-vs-cloud; stop the manual edits

Gotcha

  • terraform apply without -auto-approve requires interactive confirmation — don't use in CI without the flag.
  • The model forgets to run terraform plan before apply — always plan first, review changes.
  • State files contain sensitive data — never commit them to Git. Use remote state (S3 + DynamoDB).

Do NOT

  • Do NOT use * in IAM resource ARNs unless absolutely necessary.
  • Do NOT remove deletion_protection from databases.
  • Do NOT change provider versions without testing in Stage first.
  • Do NOT hardcode AWS account IDs — use data.aws_caller_identity.current.

レビュー

まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。

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