Harms Check Skill
Design-time harm-to-users check — the safety-by-design lens the security/privacy/compliance gates structurally miss. Assumes the product works EXACTLY as designed. /threat-model (STRIDE) asks how an attacker breaks it; /privacy-check asks about personal data; neither asks: who could this harm when it works as intended, and how could a legitimate feature be misused?
This is the design-time front-end of the BVSSH Happier dimension: a manipulative or harmful design is Happier-negative by definition, and this gate catches it before /bvssh-check would only measure it post-hoc.
When to run (JiT — conditional, NOT universal)
Fires only when the product-shape warrants it:
- User-facing product/feature (real people use it), OR
- has persuasion / retention / conversion / cancellation / consent / pricing flows (the dark-pattern surface), OR
- touches vulnerable people (children, patients, financially- or otherwise at-risk).
If none apply (internal dev tooling, a library, a build script), SKIP — say so and move on. This is a NUDGE, never a hard block.
At release, the framework asks for it (v0.321.0). When work that reaches real people has an exposure record on its diamond and no harms check recorded there, the release path says so in one advisory line: in the release gate's refusal, in scale_locks.py --exposure-state, and as context when a release is allowed. That line is the prompt to run this skill, or to record that it does not apply. It never refuses anything, and a Happier-negative verdict does not stop a release.
Workflow
1. Dark / deceptive patterns (Brignull) — does the design manipulate the user?
Check the design against the recognised, regulated catalog (deceptive.design; FTC / EU Digital Fairness Act / GDPR-consent):
Any hit = the design manipulates or coerces → Happier-NEGATIVE. Redesign for the honest default.
2. Consequence scanning (doteveryone) — intended AND unintended
- Intended consequences — which to amplify?
- Unintended consequences (assume it works as designed and scales) — which to mitigate?
- Who could this harm — including vulnerable users AND non-users / third parties / society?
- Who is least able to absorb the harm?
3. Foreseeable misuse (harms modeling) — weaponising a legitimate feature
- How could a bad actor use this feature-working-as-designed to harm someone (harassment, stalking, fraud, coercion)?
- What reasonably-foreseeable "unsupported uses" create harm?
Output
## Harms Check: [Feature/Product]
Scope trigger: [user-facing | persuasion/retention flow | vulnerable users | N/A — skipped]
### Deceptive patterns
| Pattern | Present? | Honest redesign |
|---------|----------|-----------------|
| ... | yes/no | ... |
### Consequences & foreseeable misuse
| Harm | Who (incl. non-users / vulnerable) | Working-as-designed or misuse | Mitigation |
|------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| ... | ... | ... | ... |
### Happier verdict
[net-positive for the user | Happier-NEGATIVE — redesign]
### Recommendations (NUDGE — advice, not a block)
1. ...
Record the verdict on the exposure (v0.321.0)
When the diamond carrying this work has an exposure record (exposures[] in .claude/diamonds/active.yml), write the result on the record this check was run for:
harms_check:
on: 2026-10-11 # the date the check was run
verdict: net-positive # net-positive | happier-negative | not-applicable
note: "what was found, or why it does not apply"
not-applicable is the SKIP above, written down: use it when none of the scope triggers apply, and put the reason in note.
happier-negative is recorded as it is. It does not stop a release. The person decides whether the work goes out as designed, and the release path reminds them of the verdict when it does.
- It is not one of the exposure's
gates, and nothing reads it to allow or refuse anything. Without it, the release path keeps saying that no harms check is recorded for that exposure.
- Use the Read tool on
.claude/diamonds/active.yml before editing it, and change only this key.
- No exposure record yet (the work has not been put in front of anyone): the decision-log entry below is the whole record.
Honest limits (scope guard)
This gate educates a builder who reached for a manipulative pattern without seeing the harm; it cannot stop a builder who deliberately wants to manipulate. It is a NUDGE keyed to product-shape — not a trust-&-safety / content-moderation apparatus. Online-content harms (CSAM, disinformation, hate speech) are out of scope and belong to specialised tooling, not Mycelium.
Decision Log (MANDATORY per G-P4)
APPEND a ### Harms Check entry to .claude/harness/decision-log.md with: the scope trigger, any deceptive patterns found, foreseeable-misuse / vulnerable-user harms, the Happier verdict, and mitigations accepted or waived.
Theory Citations
- Brignull: Deceptive (Dark) Patterns
- doteveryone: Consequence Scanning
- Microsoft: Harms Modeling (foreseeable misuse; vulnerable- and non-user harm)
- Smart: BVSSH — the "Happier" dimension (this gate is its design-time front-end)
- eSafety / WEF: Safety by Design (anticipate harm before it occurs)