「directory」の検索結果

Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

AI Personal Assistant network skill. Use when: contacting another PA, coordinating with peer agents, scheduling meetings between owners, broadcasting messages, looking up contacts from the local PA directory, or performing any cross-PA task. Reads contact data from data/pa-directory.json in the workspace. Does NOT contain hardcoded contact data — each PA maintains their own directory file.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Orchestrates the tdmcp Anthropic Connectors Directory (Desktop Extension / MCPB) submission prep — designs the package, writes the privacy page, migrates .dxt→.mcpb, drafts all form answers, and QAs the result. Use for ANY work on the tdmcp directory/marketplace submission, including re-runs after a rejection ("update the submission", "redo the form answers", "re-migrate the bundle", "fix the privacy page", "the directory rejected us"). Drives a 4-agent pipeline (architect → docs-author ∥ bundle-engineer → QA).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Dağıt:s deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting Tespit (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use implementing yaparken AD deception defenses for Tespit etme lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Implement Microsoft's Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) tiered administration model for Active Directory. Covers Tier 0/1/2 separation, privileged access workstations (PAWs), administrative f

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Scan, structure, validate, and submit your project to the Next Level Builders Directory (https://nextlevelbuilder.io) with 17 rich blocks, cryptographic content hashing, Polar payment handling, and automated moderation queueing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Exploit misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) ESC1 vulnerability to request certificates as high-privileged users and escalate domain privileges during authorized red team assessments.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

BloodHound is a graph-based Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden and unintended relationships within AD environments. Red teams use BloodHound to identify attac

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Implement Microsoft's Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) tiered administration model for Active Directory. Covers Tier 0/1/2 separation, privileged access workstations (PAWs), administrative f

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Claude Codeの設定をAgentShieldで検査し、秘密情報の直書き、広すぎる権限、不正な指示の混入リスクを報告し、一部の問題を自動修正するスキル。

• Claude Code導入時の設定確認
• 権限やMCP設定の変更後の監査
• 参加したリポジトリの既存設定の確認

Setting up or installing into a Python environment. One rule applies whether or not you read the body - the environment belongs with the project, so create it inside the project directory (.venv) or let uv manage it, and never in a scratch directory like /tmp and never by forcing an install into the system interpreter. Load the body before creating a virtualenv, choosing an installer, or writing run instructions for a Python project.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

When the user wants help with public relations, earned media, press coverage, journalist outreach, or media strategy (not pull requests). Also use when the user mentions 'PR,' 'press,' 'press release,' 'media outreach,' 'pitch a journalist,' 'get featured,' 'media list,' 'media kit,' 'press kit,' 'newsjacking,' 'news hijack,' 'HARO,' 'Qwoted,' 'Featured,' 'reporter request,' 'tech press,' 'TechCrunch,' 'thought leadership placement,' 'op-ed,' 'guest article,' 'press contacts,' 'podcast prep,' 'podcast guest,' 'prep me for this podcast,' 'how do I get press,' 'PR crisis,' 'crisis communications,' 'respond to backlash,' 'we got hacked,' 'data breach statement,' or 'holding statement.' Also covers crisis response when something goes wrong. For startup/SaaS/AI directory submissions, see directory-submissions. For product launches, see launch. For social-media engagement, see social. For cold-email outreach to prospects, see cold-email.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Provide comprehensive techniques for attacking Microsoft Active Directory environments. Covers reconnaissance, credential harvesting, Kerberos attacks, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and domain dominance for red team operations and penetration testing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries against domain controller event logs, looking for Kerberos TGT anomalies such as mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures. Use when hunting for Kerberos ticket forgery or krbtgt-based persistence (MITRE T1558.001) in AD environments.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery (e.g. Mimikatz-forged tickets) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption downgrades (0x17), abnormal ticket lifetimes, and krbtgt account anomalies using Splunk and Elastic SIEM queries. Use when investigating suspected forged Kerberos tickets or krbtgt credential theft in Active Directory.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect LSASS credential dumping, SAM database extraction, and NTDS.dit theft (e.g. via Mimikatz) using Sysmon Event ID 10 process-access logging, Windows Security logs, and SIEM correlation rules. Use when hunting for credential-theft activity on Windows/Active Directory hosts or triaging EDR alerts on LSASS access.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Conduct internal Active Directory reconnaissance using BloodHound Community Edition's graph database with the SharpHound (AD) and AzureHound (Entra ID) collectors, mapping ACLs, sessions, and group memberships into attack paths from a low-privileged foothold to Domain Admin. Use after an initial AD foothold to identify privilege escalation chains, or to validate that AD hardening closed known attack paths.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。