Automate 21risk tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Implement secure API design patterns including authentication, authorization, input validation, rate limiting, and protection against common API vulnerabilities
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Review the request boundary from caller identity through authorization, validated input, storage and observable response. Preserve the application's actual identity provider and data model rather than introducing a second authentication system.
Use when adding a protected endpoint, reviewing object access, replacing permissive request parsing, or investigating an API abuse path. For a concrete defect, start with the failing route and its callers; do not deploy unrelated security infrastructure.
Record the routes, caller/tenant model, identity provider, token contract, runtime and locked dependency versions, database schema, proxy topology and authorized test scope. Use synthetic identities in a test environment. Existing task authorization carries forward; production scans, account writes and message sends need their own authority. The Node examples below are integration sketches for Express, jsonwebtoken and Zod; application/database adapters are deliberately named rather than presented as a full runnable service. Confirm APIs against the installed versions before integrating.
Prefer the established provider/session middleware. When the service owns an HMAC JWT contract, require a strong server-owned key, a fixed algorithm, exact issuer and audience, and required runtime claims. Do not infer permissions from a decoded token before signature verification. Never accept a caller-selected verification algorithm.
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
// Illustrative first-party access-token contract; not a third-party OAuth adapter.
const ACCESS_POLICY = {
algorithms: ['HS256'], issuer: 'example-auth', audience: 'example-api'
};
function verifyAccessToken(token, signingKey) {
const claims = jwt.verify(token, signingKey, ACCESS_POLICY);
if (!claims || typeof claims !== 'object' ||
typeof claims.sub !== 'string' || !claims.sub ||
typeof claims.tenantId !== 'string' || !claims.tenantId ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(claims.exp) || !Number.isSafeInteger(claims.iat) ||
claims.exp <= claims.iat) {
throw new Error('Invalid access claims');
}
return { subject: claims.sub, tenantId: claims.tenantId };
}
function readBearer(header) {
if (typeof header !== 'string' || header.length > 8192) return null;
const match = /^Bearer ([A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$/i.exec(header);
return match ? match[1] : null;
}
Issue access tokens with the same issuer/audience/algorithm and a short application- approved expiration. Handle verification failure as a generic 401 without echoing the token or exception. Expiration alone does not revoke a token; define revocation or short-lived sessions according to the actual threat model. A service using asymmetric provider keys needs the provider's discovery/JWKS validation and key-rotation policy, not this HMAC example. Never reuse an access token as a refresh token.
Use the provider's supported session flow or a server-side opaque refresh design: store only a digest, expiry, user/session family and revocation state. In one atomic transaction consume the old active token and create the replacement. Concurrent reuse must not issue two successors; defined reuse handling revokes the affected family. Check current user status and permissions when issuing new access tokens. Bind refresh to the intended client/session and protect cookie-based requests against CSRF. Do not log tokens, store them plaintext in a database, or return a refresh token through a URL. Test simultaneous refresh, expiry, replay, revocation and transaction failure before calling the flow complete. No database transaction adapter is bundled here.
Authentication identifies the caller; authorization decides the exact operation on an object and tenant. A role name does not automatically grant cross-tenant access. Apply the owner/tenant predicate in the database mutation to avoid a check-then-write race, and allowlist writable properties. Use 404/403 consistently with the product's resource-disclosure policy.
// Prisma-style sketch; id and tenant types must match your actual schema.
async function deleteOwnedPost(prisma, postId, principal) {
const result = await prisma.post.deleteMany({
where: { id: postId, userId: principal.subject, tenantId: principal.tenantId }
});
return result.count === 1;
}
An administrator path needs an explicit separate policy and audit event; do not add an implicit admin bypass to every owner check. Test a valid user accessing another user's object, the same ID in another tenant, deleted memberships and bulk endpoints.
Reject partial numeric parses (12abc is not ID 12), unsafe integers, unexpected
properties and oversized requests. Use parameterized database queries.
まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。
概要と使いどころ
Automate 21risk tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Automate 2chat tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。